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ABSTRACT 
I examine various instances of miscommunication to look for factors that might provide a 
clearer understanding of the nature of meaning. My focus is on how meaning relates to 
mind. I am therefore concerned primarily with utterances as linguistic units in themselves, 
and only secondarily with propositions and speech acts formed from utterances.  
 
I approach the task on the basis of the modularity of mind, and consider cases of 
miscommunication under three headings: 
 
(a) the acquisition of meaning (how children acquire language and thereby meaning); 
(b) the expression of meaning (factors that determine how we express meaning in our 
utterances); and 
(c) the extraction of meaning (how we determine the meaning of utterances). 
 
I review various philosophical approaches to meaning, including those of Davidson, Frege, 
Grice, Putnam, Searle and Tarski. I assess their strengths and weaknesses in the light of the 
cases of miscommunication that have some bearing upon them.  
 
In the final part of the thesis I attempt to provide a coherent account of what meaning is, 
and how meaning and language are related, before suggesting in conclusion that my 
proposed account of meaning fits well with the modular theory of mind. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
I begin by explaining the purpose of, and motivation for, this study.  I then 
summarise the underlying philosophical assumptions, set out some limitations, and describe 
some usages. After outlining my position on perception and perceptual representation, I end 
by outlining the approach to be adopted and the organisation of the thesis. 
1.1 The purpose and motivation of the study 
 
My purpose is to examine instances of miscommunication for what they reveal 
about the normal operation of the language faculty of the human mind, and in particular the 
way in which meaning is acquired, expressed and extracted. No specific philosophical 
theory of meaning is adopted, rather the cases of miscommunication are used to assess the 
usefulness of different approaches to explaining meaning.  
 
The motivation for this approach arises from two sources. One is the fact that for ten 
years I was responsible for the computer software controlling a proprietary complex 
telephone system, including the tracing and correcting of faults. Reflecting on my 
experience, it became clear that I had learned more about the normal operation of the 
system by studying its faults than I could possibly have learnt from observing it in error-
free operation.  
 
The other motivation is the parallel to this experience that I found in the field of 
neurology. It is clear from books on this subject (eg Sachs 1986, Goldberg 2001) that one 
of the major factors in the development of that discipline has been the study of people with 
brain injury or brain defects. A leading cognitive neuroscientist has explained the role of 
error as follows: 
 
 
[A]ny system makes certain characteristic types of error when it fails. 
Luckily, these errors are very informative. Not only are the errors important 
for the system to learn, they are also important for us when we observe the 
system for discovering how the system works. (Frith 2007 p 132) 
 
1.2 Some underlying assumptions 
 
It is not practical in the space allowed to outline the reasons for all the philosophical 
ideas that inform my approach to this thesis. The following points should be noted. 
 
  The study is based on a broadly monist view of mind. It is assumed that everything that 
exists is either physical in essence or relates to the physical. No view is taken about 
how the latter relates to the former (whether property dualism, supervenience, etc).  
 
  The approach adopted is essentially empiricist, although some limited concepts are 
assumed to be innate. 
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  It is assumed that there is a close relationship between the human mind and the human 
brain, and that any theory about the operation of the human mind must be compatible 
with empirical knowledge about the operation of the human brain. However, no specific 
relationship is assumed. In particular, when I discuss perceptual representations, I am 
referring to both mental representations and neuronal patterns in the brain, without 
commitment as to how they are related. 
 
   The theory of the Massive Modularity of the Mind (Carruthers 2006, Bermudez 2005 
pp 228ff) is assumed, including a language faculty comprised of various modules. 
1.3 Limitations and usages 
 
The study is limited to a consideration of the human mind. No attempt is made to 
investigate whether the conclusions reached are valid for mind in general, for example alien 
minds or minded computers. 
 
Many of the terms used in philosophy have a meaning that differs from their use in 
normal conversation, and not infrequently that also differs from their use by other 
philosophers. In order to avoid confusion I will make use of modifiers to differentiate 
possibly confusing terms, or in some cases create a neologism to convey a sense for which I 
could find no existing term.  
 
I take communication to be in essence the transmission of information from one 
person to another, either directly or through a medium such as writing. Clearly, not all 
communication involves language: I can, for example, communicate my agreement to a 
proposal by a nod of the head. In this thesis I will focus on the use of language to 
communicate; miscommunication is therefore a failure in the transmission of information 
by linguistic means. 
 
This study will focus primarily on spoken language, although some reference will be 
made to both signed and written language.  Because I will also discuss the concept of a 
“language of thought” I will use LOS to refer to spoken (or signed) language and LOT to 
refer to the language of thought. References to the speech community include all modes of 
contact: direct speech, signing, writing and media such as film and television. In discussing 
language acquisition and speech communities I will ignore bilingualism: for simplicity I 
will assume that all speech communities are monolingual. 
 
The term utterance will be used for any linguistic communication whether spoken, 
signed or written with its immediate context; I will not include purely non-linguistic 
communication. The term utterer will refer to the originator of an utterance, without 
distinction between speaker, signer or writer; the term utteree will be coined to refer 
without distinction to listener or reader. 
 
The terms ‘sense’ and ‘reference’ are widely use in philosophy as translations of the 
terms ‘Sinn’ and ‘Bedeutung’ coined by Frege (2001 pp 199ff). The former term is a 
particular problem, since it is used in many phrases such as “common sense” or “make 
sense”, as well as to describe the differing meanings of words listed in a dictionary. I will Mind, Meaning and Miscommunication 
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use senseF in the Fregean use of the term, senseD to denote the different senses of terms as 
found in a dictionary, and sense (without subscript) for all other uses of the term. I will 
similarly use referenceF when used in its technical philosophical sense. 
 
This thesis is concerned with the philosophy of mind and the philosophy of language, 
not with linguistics. Wherever possible, technical linguistic terms will be avoided. The 
concept of ‘word’ poses a problem for linguists, but the use of terms such as ‘morpheme’ or 
‘lexeme’ in this study would introduce the sort of technical concepts that I wish to avoid. I 
will therefore use the neutral term ‘term’ throughout the thesis to refer to any word or 
combination of words that have a distinct meaning. For example, ‘black’ and ‘bird’ are 
terms: “black bird” comprises two terms; but ‘blackbird’ is a separate term.  
 
During the main part of the thesis the term ‘mean’ and its cognates will be used (other 
than in quotations) in a non-technical general sense. Differentiation of differing usages of 
the term, as well as the introduction of other special terms, will be left until the concluding 
part. 
1.4 Perceptions and perceptual representations 
 
It will be necessary in the course of this thesis to make reference to perceptions. I 
will not be able in the space available to defend the view that I take on this matter, so it 
should be noted that I am making the following assumptions, whilst recognising that there 
are opposing views. I use the term ‘object’ in this section in its broadest possible sense to 
include all features of reality identifiable through our senses including, for example, 
properties and events. 
 
I assume that every impact upon our sense organs causes distinctive patterns of 
neuronal firings within the brain, and that these patterns can be stored within memory and 
retrieved. As one neurologist has explained, “when you imagine an object there is partial 
activation of the same sensory pathways in the brain as when that object is actually seen” 
(Ramachandran 2003 p156). 
 
I assume that there are (at least) two levels of pattern formation accompanying our 
perceptual experiences. The first is the immediate pattern arising from whatever is present 
to the senses. I will term this image, echoing Frege’s use of the term (Frege 2001 p 201), 
without any implication that this representation is pictorial, or limited to visual perceptions. 
We have a different image of an object (or a number of distinct images: one for each sense 
involved) each time it is present to our senses.  
 
I assume that our mind/brain also creates and stores a higher level representation of 
each new object that is presented to our senses, that is a pattern of neuronal firings that 
identifies what are perceived as the essential elements of the image. Thus each time I read 
the preceding sentence I have four separate images of the letter ‘p’, but I also have a higher 
level representation that might be expressed linguistically as “an ellipse with a tangential 
line on the left hand side when viewed from below extending from a point level with the 
top of the ellipse to a point a least one half of the height of the ellipse below the bottom Mind, Meaning and Miscommunication 
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thereof”. This means that I can recognise a ‘p’ when I am reading something written upside 
down, even though the image appears more like a ‘d’. 
 
Perceptual representations are therefore not images, but, in some way that I do not 
define, represent what is common to all perceptual experiences to date of the same object or 
of different tokens of the same type of object. I also assume that, at least in the initial stages 
of coming to identify a new sensory experience, this perceptual representation is modified 
as new views of the object perceived are experienced. So, for example, a child will come to 
have a core perceptual representation of its mother which is triggered whether or not she is 
wearing make-up, whatever clothes she may have on, etc. 
 
I assume that when two perceptual experiences occur simultaneously on a number 
of occasions a link is created between the two perceptions (Hebbian learning, see Robertson 
1999 p 13). Specifically for the purposes of this thesis, I assume that a link is created 
between the representation of the sound of a term and the perceptual representation that is 
triggered at the same time. This is discussed more fully in section 4.1. 
1.5 The approach to be adopted 
 
This chapter and the following one form the introduction to the thesis. The next three 
parts form the main body of the work in which cases of miscommunication are considered, 
and related philosophical issues are examined.  The cases of miscommunication comprise: 
 
  Actual examples from my own experience 
  Thought experiments which draw on my own experience 
  Examples heard about or read about. 
 
Each case will be analysed using some or all of the following questions: 
 
  What caused the failure in communication? 
  What does this failure indicate about how meaning should work? 
  Does this support or contradict existing theories of meaning? 
  What other lessons about meaning can be learned from this case? 
 
Part Two is concerned with how we acquire language and therefore meaning. It will 
examine our innate language faculty and three methods by which we acquire the meaning 
of terms. Part Three examines how we express meaning in our utterances, and Part Four 
how we extract meaning from utterances.  
 
The final part of the thesis will draw together everything that has been learnt from 
examining the cases of miscommunication. It will analyse the concept of meaning, suggest 
how meaning and language are related, and examine how meaning fits into a modular 
structure of the human mind. Mind, Meaning and Miscommunication 
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CHAPTER 2: MEANING AND TRUTH 
Case 1 
  My wife and I went one evening to our elder son’s house, in order to 
babysit our two-year old twin grandsons. In their house the lounge forms 
the ground floor and the kitchen is in the semi-basement. My wife went 
down to the kitchen with T, the younger twin, to prepare their tea, leaving 
the elder twin, H, in the lounge with me. He decided to help as well and 
started to go down the stairs to join them. Unfortunately he slipped and 
fell all the way down, but was caught by his grandmother before he hit the 
floor. He was frightened, though unhurt, and screamed loudly. His 
brother, T, immediately started to cry as well, and I rushed downstairs to 
see what had happened. 
  We were able to settle them both down and the evening continued 
until Mum and Dad arrived home. We were telling them what had 
happened when T joined in the conversation. “Grandpa pushed him!” he 
said.  
 
This true story raises two issues about meaning. In this chapter I consider the first of 
these – the relationship between meaning and truth. I consider briefly whether failure to tell 
the truth constitutes miscommunication. Following this, I summarise the views of three 
philosophers who share a common view about the relationship of meaning to truth. I draw a 
distinction between a sentence and what the sentence is used for, and demonstrate how this 
impacts on the claim that truth conditions can be used to determine the meaning of all 
sentences. Finally I make clear the concept of meaning that I will adopt for this study.  
2.1 Communicative failure and truth 
 
In this section I argue that the fact that an utterance is untrue does not, of itself, 
constitute grounds for classifying it as a case of miscommunication. 
 
I do not know whether my grandson told a deliberate lie (I was still sitting on the 
couch when his brother fell) or whether he was simply trying to come to the best 
explanation of what had happened. Whatever his motive, he failed to communicate to his 
parents what had actually happened. If failures of this type are to be classified as 
miscommunications, then a significant proportion of utterances must be considered to be 
miscommunications.  
 
It is a fact of life that many people lie deliberately, that many people fail to tell the 
truth inadvertently by asserting as truths matters for which they have insufficient evidence, 
and that people make mistakes. I will return to the issue of error in section 4.3. 
 
Leaving aside the issue of lying, it would, I suggest, be wholly inappropriate to 
argue, for example, that: 
 Mind, Meaning and Miscommunication 
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(a)  The claims of astrology are false; 
(b)  Predictions based on astrology are likely to be untrue; 
(c)  Therefore every utterance involving an astrological prediction should be 
classified as a miscommunication. 
 
I will therefore reject the untruthfulness of an utterance as a reason for classifying it 
as a miscommunication. In the course of the following chapters I will select cases of 
miscommunication on purely pragmatic grounds. But for the remainder of this chapter I 
will concentrate on the alleged relationship between truth and meaning. 
2.2 Some philosophical views on meaning and truth 
 
In this section I will briefly outline a common thread in the views of some major 
philosophers who have written about meaning and truth. I will trace the development of this 
common thread before moving on in the following sections to criticise some aspects of this 
approach.  
2,2.1 Frege 
 
Frege wrote extensively towards the end of the nineteenth century about logic and 
language. He distinguished between logical form and grammatical form, and set out 
proposals for analysing propositions, applying the mathematical concept of functions to 
language. 
 
Using Frege’s approach, a proposition such as “Mary sang” would be expressed as a 
function plus a variable: “Sang(a)” where ‘Sang’ is the function of singing and ‘a’  
represents the person doing the singing. A proposition such as “Mary loves John” would 
take the form “Loves(a,b)” where ‘Loves’ is the function of loving, ‘a’ is the person doing 
the loving and ‘b’ is the person loved. 
 
Using this method it follows that “Sang(a) = True” if the person represented by ‘a’ 
did in fact sing and “Sang(a) = False” if they did not. Similarly, “Loves(a,b) = True” if both 
the person represented by ‘a’ does love, and the person represented by ‘b’ is the person they 
love. By this means a relationship is marked between the meaning of propositions and their 
truth conditions (see Pietroski 2007 p 11). 
 
This statement of the relationship between meaning and truth appears straight-
forward and eminently reasonable. It should be noted, however, that Frege is here dealing 
specifically with the meaning of propositions, and not with meaning in general. I will return 
to this point in section 2.4 
2,2.2 Tarski 
 
It was nearly half a century later that Tarski set out his thoughts on truth and 
meaning in a paper entitled The Semantic Conception of Truth and the Foundation of 
Semantics (Tarski 2001 pp 69ff).  In an attempt to define the concept of truth by the use of 
meaning, he started from the claim that 
 Mind, Meaning and Miscommunication 
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The sentence “snow is white” is true if, and only if, snow is white 
 
and from this generated a general statement in which X replaces the name of a sentence and 
p replaces the sentence itself. This general statement, which came to be known as a  
‘T-sentence’ takes the form 
 
 (T) X is true if, and only if, p 
 
provided that the sentence represented by ‘p’ is an accurate translation of the sentence 
whose name is represented by 'X’. 
 
Although Tarski is dealing with sentences, whereas Frege was concerned with 
propositions, there is an underlying similarity between their respective formulations. The 
truth of the propositional sentence “Mary sang” would be expressed by Frege’s method as 
 
Sang(Mary) = True if Mary had sung 
 
and by Tarski’s method as 
 
(T) ‘Mary Sang’ is True if, and only if, Mary sang. 
 
I will return to the relationship between the two approaches in section 2.4 after 
looking at the approach favoured by Davidson. 
 
2,2.3 Davidson 
 
Davidson’s approach to meaning and truth is the opposite of Tarski’s. Whereas 
Tarski sought to define truth by using meaning, Davidson set out to explain meaning using 
truth as a primitive. In his article Truth and Meaning, a quarter of a century after Tarski’s 
article, Davidson made the following statement. 
 
 
There is no need to suppress, of course, the obvious connection between a 
definition of truth of the kind Tarski has shown how to construct, and the 
concept of meaning. It is this: the definition works by giving necessary and 
sufficient conditions for the truth of every sentence, and to give truth 
conditions is a way of giving the meaning of a sentence. (2001a p 102) 
 
 
In a later article returning to the theme of meaning and truth, Davidson qualified the 
conditions under which a sentence can be considered to be true. He added two factors that 
must be included: the location and time at which the sentence is uttered. He therefore gave 
the following example of a T-sentence. 
 
 
“Es schneit” is true (in German) for a speaker x at time t if and only if it is  Mind, Meaning and Miscommunication 
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snowing at t (and near x). (Davidson 2001b p 470) 
 
 
Despite the addition of two factors, Davidson’s statement of the relationship between 
meaning and truth has an underlying similarity to those by Frege and Tarski. I will discuss 
this similarity in section 2.4 but in the meantime I will consider the views of a philosopher 
who suggested how this approach might be extended to other sentence types. 
2.2.4 Strawson 
 
In his inaugural lecture at Oxford, subsequently published as Meaning and Truth, 
Strawson discussed the “Homeric” struggle between what he termed “the theorists of 
communication-intention and the theorists of formal semantics” (Strawson  2001 p 110-1). 
He discussed Davidson’s views on truth conditions as one example of the latter, and 
suggested how one class of objection to those views might be answered. 
 
To deal with the claims that “there are some kinds of sentences . . . to which the 
notion of truth-conditions seems inappropriate” (ibid p 113), Strawson suggested that non-
declarative sentences, such as imperative and optative sentences (i.e. commands and 
wishes), can have fulfilment conditions that derive from the truth-condition of the related 
declarative sentence (ibid p 114). However, having conceded this possible modification to 
the truth conditional approach, Strawson rejected it and came down firmly on the side of the 
communication intention theorists. 
 
2.2.5 Conclusion 
 
I have summarised how three philosophers have related meaning and truth in 
propositions or declarative sentences, and have noted a suggestion by Strawson as to how 
to extend this approach to other sentence types.  Other philosophers have rejected this 
proposal. Miller, for example, talks about “the countless sentences of language that do not 
have truth conditions, but which are nevertheless meaningful” (Miller 1998 p 56). 
 
 I discuss below some claims that truth conditions even in declarative sentences are 
insufficient to provide the basis for a general theory of meaning, but before that I look 
briefly at what sentences are and their relationship to propositions. 
2.3 Sentences and propositions 
 
In this section I clarify how I understand the term ‘sentence’, what types of sentence 
exist and how sentences are related to other entities such as propositions. 
 
A sentence is a string of symbols. Those symbols may be auditory, in the case of 
speech, marks on a surface, in the case of writing, or movements of hands and arms in the 
case of sign language. If we take spoken language as an example, the string of symbols 
forming an utterance can be analysed at three levels: 
 
  individual sounds (technically phonemes) Mind, Meaning and Miscommunication 
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  groups of sounds forming a semantic unit (commonly words but sometimes segments of 
words) 
  groups of semantic units forming a communally recognised unit (ie phrase or sentence: 
I will return to the difference between phrase and sentence in Part 5). 
 
I am not concerned with the question of how sentence boundaries are determined, 
but simply with the fact that the sentence is a string of symbols. Those symbols can be used 
for a variety of purposes including to express a wish, to give an order, or to make an 
assertion. It is common to speak of declarative sentences, or interrogative sentences, or 
optative sentences and so on. But these are not attributes of the sentence as a string of 
symbols but rather of the purpose to which that string has been put. 
 
So when I speak of “a declarative sentence” I am speaking of a string of symbols 
being used to make an assertion; when I speak of “an interrogative sentence’ I am speaking 
of a string of symbols being used to ask a question. In many cases the string of symbols 
will have a specific form that indicates the purposes for which it is being used, but this is 
complicated by the fact (to which I will return in a later chapter) that sentences in one form 
may be used for a different purpose. To give one simple example at this point, ‘can you 
reach the salt?’ has the form of a question but will often be used as a request. 
 
I have claimed that there is an important distinction between the sentence as a string 
of symbols and the purpose to which that string is put. However, the term ‘sentence’ is 
often used in the latter senseD, which is why terms such as ‘declarative sentence’ are 
common. It is important to recognise these two differing uses of the term ‘sentence’. 
 
One important use of sentences is to express propositions. This term is used to refer 
to a mental state that can be expressed by a sentence. So, for example, if I say “snow is 
white” I am expressing the same proposition as my German friend who says that “Schnee 
ist weiss”. I am not concerned here with the question of whether propositions are linguistic 
or non-linguistic entities, nor the relationship between propositions and Mentalese (see 
chapter 3). My point is that there is a difference between a proposition and the sentence 
formed in a communal language to express it 
 
In this section I have drawn a distinction between the sentence as a string of 
symbols and the use to which that string is put. Confusion arises when the term ‘sentence’ 
is used in relation to the latter, as when philosophers refer to ‘declarative sentences’. I have 
also stressed that although propositions can only be expressed and understood by means of 
sentences, the distinction between the two entities must be kept clear. 
 
This point is well made by Jeffrey King. 
 
 
[W]hen speakers say the same thing by means of different declarative 
sentences, there is some (non-linguistic) thing, a proposition, that each has 
said. This proposition is said to be expressed by . . . the sentences uttered  
. . . [and] the proposition is taken to be the thing that is in the first instance Mind, Meaning and Miscommunication 
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true or false. A declarative sentence is true or false derivatively, in virtue 
of expressing . . . a true or false proposition. (King 2001 p 1 italics in 
original) 
 
2.4 Truth, meaning and sentences 
 
In this penultimate section I question Davidson’s claim that truth conditions define 
the meaning of a sentence, even in the limited case of declarative sentences. In so doing, I 
make the distinction discussed above between the sentence and the purpose to which it is 
put. 
 
The traditional view about truth and meaning is illustrated by the claim by Davidson 
that “ ‘Es schneit’ is true (in German) for a speaker x at time t if and only if it is snowing at t 
(and near x)” (Davidson 2001b p 470). But consider the following conversation. 
 
CHILD  Dad, say something to me in German. 
FATHER  Es schneit heute 
CHILD  That means ‘it is snowing today’ 
 
In this situation truth conditions play no role in enabling both the utterer and utteree 
to understand that “es schneit” means “it is snowing”. 
 
Furthermore, verbal paradoxes also fail to meet Davidson’s criteria for truth 
conditions. Kripke has made a telling criticism of truth conditions (cited in Taylor 1998 pp 
133-134). His scenario can be summed up as follows: 
 
(1) A says of B “The majority of B’s statements about X are false” 
(2) B says of A “Everything A says about X is true” 
 
If apart from (1) B’s statements about X are equally balanced between true and false, 
and (1) is A’s only statement about X, then it is impossible to assign coherent truth 
conditions to either statement. There is an unresolvable paradox. 
 
Platts has also claimed that some declarative sentences have no definite truth 
conditions (Platts 1979 pp 167ff). He cites the example of “Theo is large” for which truth 
conditions cannot be obtained until it is known what ‘Theo’ refers to. If Theo is a flea, for 
example, the range of the term ‘large’ will be very different from the situation if Theo is an 
elephant.  
 
There is one further possible objection to explaining meaning by the use of truth 
conditions: that it depends upon the meaning of the metalanguage used on the right hand 
side of a Tarskian sentence, but fails to account for meaning in the metalanguage. It is 
outside the scope of this thesis to explore this argument in depth, but it is one that I find 
persuasive. 
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In this section I have claimed that the meaning of sentences, even in the limited 
case of declarative sentences, cannot be consistently explained by truth conditions in the 
way advocated by Davidson and others. If it does indeed fail in this limited case, then it 
fails as an explanation of meaning in general. In the final part of this chapter I consider the 
two different senseDs of the term “meaning” as used by Davidson. 
2.5 Two senses of meaning 
 
In this section I provide a simple illustration of the difference between two  
senseDs of “meaning”, and then make clear which senseD of the term is considered in this 
paper. 
 
Davidson says that “what I call a theory of meaning has after all turned out to make 
no use of meanings, whether of sentences or words” (Davidson 2001a p 102). In order to 
understand the distinction that Davidson makes between ‘meaning’ and ‘meanings’, we 
must keep clear the distinction between the words that form a proposition or an assertion, 
and the proposition and assertion itself. 
 
If I say “I am twenty five years old” or “I will be twenty six next birthday” I use 
different words to make the same assertion. The two sentences differ in their vocabulary so 
that, for example, the second statement uses the meaning of the term ‘birthday’. The 
meaning of the two sentences is therefore different, but as an assertion they mean the same 
thing. It is therefore necessary to distinguish linguistic meaning of sentences from the 
logical meaning of their use (as proposition, assertion, etc). 
 
In this thesis my focus is on meaning in the first senseD (in which the two sentences 
quoted in the previous paragraph have different meanings) and not the second (in which they 
mean the same thing). I will begin the process of using miscommunication to understand the 
normal operation of meaning by considering in the next chapter what the story that began 
this chapter has to reveal about the innate ability of humans to acquire meaning. Mind, Meaning and Miscommunication 
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CHAPTER 3: THE LANGUAGE INSTINCT 
In the previous chapter I concluded that my grandson’s utterance “grandpa pushed 
him” is not an example of miscommunication. Nevertheless, before going on to look at 
relevant examples of miscommunication, there is another important issue raised by his 
utterance. My grandson, at less than two years of age, (a) formed a sentence with subject, 
verb and object in the correct order; (b) added the past tense sign ‘–ed’ to the verb, and (c) 
selected the proper form of the personal pronoun to make it the object rather than the 
subject of the verb. And he did all this without any specific teaching of these rules by his 
parents. 
 
In this chapter, therefore, I turn my attention to what has been called by Pinker ‘the 
language instinct’ (Pinker 1994), which I will equate with what Fodor calls ‘the language of 
thought’ (Fodor 1975). For the purposes of this thesis I am going to accept without question 
that these are one and the same thing and that this “thing” exists, whilst acknowledging that 
there are contrary views. The focus will be primarily on empirical data and on implications 
that are more psychological than philosophical. This is necessary to provide a solid 
foundation for the philosophical views that will be discussed in later chapters.  
 
I begin by noting a significant difference between the language of thought and other 
natural languages. I then examine the relationship between language and thinking, before 
summarising some empirical data about children’s innate language ability. I conclude the 
chapter by drawing attention to some aspects of this innate ability that are relevant to the 
study of meaning. 
3.1 Two types of language distinguished 
 
In this section I outline the features of most natural languages, which I designate as 
“languages of speech or signs” (LOS) and contrast these with what has been termed the 
“language of thought” (LOT).  In particular, I note a difference in the form of the 
vocabulary of the two categories of language. 
 
Philosophers traditionally distinguish between natural languages, which evolved 
and continue to evolve among human communities (such as English, French or 
Mongolian), and artificial languages constructed by individuals. However, I suggest that a 
further distinction must be made within the category of natural languages.  
 
In the great majority of natural languages a system of sounds is used to represent 
aspects of reality. So, for example, in French the sound that in English forms the name of 
the letter ‘O’ (written in French as “eau”) represents the chemical substance with the 
formula H2O that is found in rivers, lakes and oceans. Sign languages used by the deaf do 
not make use of sounds to represent reality, but the position and movement of the hands 
and arms. Apart from this one difference, spoken and signed languages are essentially alike, 
and I will subsume both under the term LOS. Since I am focussing primarily on spoken 
language, as stated in the introduction, I will ignore the issue of written symbols in natural 
languages. 
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Languages require more than a vocabulary: there must also be rules about how that 
vocabulary can be used – the grammar of the language. Traditionally grammar is divided 
into two. Morphology provides rules about how terms can be modified (for example, add ‘-
ed’ to ‘bang’ to indicate that the action designated by  ‘bang’ took place in the past). Syntax 
provides rules about how terms can be strung together, so that, for example, in the utterance 
‘the dog bit the man’ I can tell that it was the dog that did the biting and the man who was 
bitten and not vice versa. For the present purpose it is the distinction between vocabulary 
and grammar that is significant. 
 
In his book The Language of Thought, Jerry Fodor argues strongly that in order to 
learn a language (ie a LOS) we need to already know a language. To avoid an infinite 
regression, he proposes therefore the existence of an innate language of thought (LOT), 
often referred to as “Mentalese”.  This language is clearly a natural language but, equally 
clearly, it cannot use sounds or bodily movements to represent reality. It must therefore use 
some other means to form its vocabulary. 
 
This makes Mentalese significantly different from other natural languages (which I 
will term communal languages). I discuss some issues about Mentalese in the following 
sections. 
3.2 Thinking without words 
 
I look briefly now at some empirical evidence of thought without the use of a 
communal language, and go on to consider what this implies about the language of thought. 
This will prepare the way in the following section to consider the question of what forms 
the vocabulary of the language of thought, as well as what syntactical concepts it might 
include.  
 
As I think about this thesis, I do so using my natural language of English, going 
through the process of “inner speech” (see, for example, Carruthers 2006 pp 232-236). It is 
tempting to think, on the basis of this and similar experiences, that I do all my thinking in 
English, and that everyone thinks in their communal language. There is, however, clear 
evidence that this is not so. 
 
In the chapter of his book The Language Instinct that he entitles ‘Mentalese’, Pinker 
refers to “deaf adults occasionally discovered who lack any form of language [ie LOS] 
whatsoever – no sign language, no writing, no lip reading, no speech” (Pinker 1994 p 67). 
He goes on to recount the case, reported by Susan Schaller, of a deaf Mexican immigrant in 
Los Angeles who had no language but “conveyed an unmistakable intelligence and 
curiosity” (ibid). After he was introduced to sign language he led his teacher to other 
languageless adults. “Despite their isolation from the verbal world,” says Pinker, “they 
displayed many abstract forms of thinking like rebuilding broken locks, handling money, 
playing card games and entertaining each other with long pantomimed narratives” (ibid p 
68).  
If the thought processes of these and similar adults involve LOT then the question 
of the vocabulary of this language arises. Although Fodor discusses the vocabulary for his 
concept of the Language of Thought (Fodor 1975 pp 124ff), he does so in the context of Mind, Meaning and Miscommunication 
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mapping the vocabulary of a natural language to the internal vocabulary of LOT. He does 
not discuss what is the intrinsic vocabulary of this language, although he does suggest that 
its scope may be less than the vocabulary of a LOS (ibid). 
 
It makes little sense to suppose that we are all born with an innate vocabulary 
sufficient to represent the whole of reality. For pre-linguistic children and LOS-less adults I 
suggest that the only realistic contenders for the representations that form the semantic 
vocabulary of their thinking are (a) perceptual representations, most commonly visual 
representations and (b) conceptual representations. By the latter I am referring to concepts 
that derive from perceptual representations. Thus, for example, a LOS-less adult who has 
perceptual representations of cats and dogs and horses, etc, may come to have a concept 
equivalent to the English term ‘animal’ by generalising from these separate perceptions (see 
my earlier comments in section 1.4). 
 
3.3 Some basic concepts in the language of thought 
 
If I am correct that it is perceptual and conceptual representations that form the 
main semantic vocabulary of LOT for LOS-less persons, there still remains the question of 
syntactic terms (ie terms such as ‘and’, or ‘so’ or ‘who’ that provide the structure of 
language). I turn now, therefore, to consider briefly what basic concepts must exist and be 
represented within LOT in order (a) to enable non-verbal thought and (b) to recognise and 
acquire natural language.  It is not my intention to provide an exhaustive list of such terms, 
nor to justify my selection, but simply to suggest some of the more obvious contenders. 
These include: 
 
  Linguistic concepts such as subject and object, noun and verb, statement and question 
(that is, the concepts that form the Universal Grammar proposed by Chomsky (Cook 
and Newsom 1996 ) 
  Ontological concepts such as objects, properties, actions and events 
  Logical operators Not (), And (&), Or (v), Material implication (), Iff () 
  Comparison relationships: Equal, More and Less (for physical properties including 
length, area and volume) 
  Spatial relationships such as in, out, on, under, to and from 
  Temporal relationships such as before and after 
  Some quantitative concepts such as all and some. 
  Numbers up to three or four (Joyce 2002) 
 
It is my contention that the existence of these basic concepts plus the perceptions 
and conceptions that accrue through normal experience are sufficient to explain the 
thinking abilities of pre-linguistic children and LOS-less adults such as those described by 
Pinker.  
 
In this and the preceding section I referred to empirical evidence that there exists an 
innate linguistic ability that can be considered as a “language of thought”. I suggested that 
the vocabulary of this language comprises perceptual and conceptual representations which 
combine with innate representations of ontological, grammatical and relational concepts to Mind, Meaning and Miscommunication 
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make it possible for humans to think without the acquisition of a communal language. In 
the next section I turn to the issue of how this innate language may be used in the 
acquisition of a communal language. 
3.4 Innate language skills in children 
 
I summarise in the following paragraphs the empirical evidence for the existence of 
an innate language ability in children. I list some of the elements that comprise this ability, 
and note that some of these are lost if children are not exposed to language before puberty. I 
end with certain conclusions that are relevant to the study of meaning. 
 
Pinker sums up the situation demonstrated by various empirical studies as “all 
infants come into the world with linguistic skills” (Pinker 1994 p 263). To make the point 
clear, he says “Infants come equipped with these skills; they do not learn them by listening 
to their parents’ speech” (ibid p 264). He is not denying that children acquire language by 
listening to their parents: he is denying that they acquire the ability to learn language in that 
way. This is clearly shown by the fact that children actually compensate for their parents’ 
linguistic errors, for example in the case of a deaf boy who acquired American Sign 
Language from parents who spoke it badly, and spoke it better than they did (ibid pp 38-
39). 
 
The innate linguistic skills of a normal child include: 
 
  Recognising language (as opposed to other sounds made by people around them) 
 
  Distinguishing their communal language from other languages as young as five days 
old (Pinker 1994 p 264) 
 
  Analysing the distinct sounds (phonemes) of their communal language long before they 
are capable of reproducing them (ibid pp 264-265) 
 
  Extracting grammatical structures from sentences long before they are capable of 
speaking in sentences (ibid p 268) 
 
  Discovering regularities in language and grasping their meaning and use (clearly 
demonstrated by common errors such as using ‘mouses’ as the plural of mouse) 
 
  Matching syntactic terms with their innate counterparts in LOT (which may explain 
how children learn to use words such as “and”, “who” and “why”). 
 
Having identified these several components of the innate language ability of 
children, I focus in the following section on the last three of these, to which I give the term 
‘systematic language acquisition’, since it involves the child identifying a system within the 
discourse of their speech community. Mind, Meaning and Miscommunication 
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3.5 Systematic language acquisition 
 
In this section I comment briefly on the nature of systematic language acquisition 
and its essential difference from the other forms of language acquisition which I discuss in 
chapters 4 and 5. 
 
As a general rule children are not specifically taught the meaning of words such as 
‘and’ or ‘or’, nor the meaning of suffixes such as ‘-s’ or ‘-ed’ (in the case of English: 
similar examples can be found for other languages). I am not concerned here with 
explaining the process by which children come to understand such matters, except to 
comment that it does not appear to be conscious. The significant fact is that children learn 
the meaning of certain terms by a specific mechanism that is different to those to be 
discussed in the following chapters. 
 
I suggest that the mechanism, to which I give the title “systematic language 
acquisition”, involves the recognition of a match between the use of a term in the 
communal language and an innate concept forming part of the language of thought. I am 
not claiming that Fodor is right in his assertion that children form and test hypotheses 
(Fodor 1975 pp 27ff); I am not concerned with the precise details of the mechanism, but 
simply with the fact that there is a mechanism which explains my grandson’s acquisition of 
the use of “-ed” to mark the past tense and the use of “him” in the object position. 
 
It is of note that this ability is temporary, and disappears at around the time that 
children reach puberty. This point is clearly demonstrated by the case of a girl named Genie 
Wiley, whose experience was reported in a Channel 5 documentary about the brain 
(Channel 5 2007; Pinker 1994 pp 291-292). She had been kept locked up in one room of 
her parents’ house until the age of thirteen, with no exposure to language. When finally 
exposed to language her vocabulary blossomed, but she could not cope with grammar. An 
internet article about her experience reveals the problem. 
 
 
Susan Curtiss, professor of linguistics, tempers this apparent success “She 
has learned a lot of words, she has an enormous vocabulary, but language is 
not words, language is grammar, language is sentences. So it wasn’t that she 
was mentally deficient, she was deficient in the mental faculty we call 
grammar”. (http://www.mymultiplesclerosis.co.uk/misc/wild-child.html 
downloaded 17/07/2007) 
 
 
A significant point about the abilities that children demonstrate is that they are 
subconscious (that is, we are not conscious of these thought processes and cannot be 
conscious of them). Children are not aware that they are analysing the sounds of their 
communal language, or identifying whether it is a Subject-Verb-Object language or a Verb-
Subject-Object language (Cook and Newsom, 1996, pp 215-216). My grandson did not 
consciously decide “I must start my utterance with the subject, I must add the past tense Mind, Meaning and Miscommunication 
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marker to the verb, and I must select the object form of the personal pronoun”: he simply 
did these things. 
3.6 Conclusion 
 
In this chapter I looked briefly at the evidence for an innate linguistic ability. This 
enables pre-literate or a-literate people to think and has been termed ‘the language of 
thought’. It also enables children to acquire language and in particular to recognise, learn 
and utilise those features of language that cannot be learned by parents pointing to an object 
and giving it a name. I have termed this process ‘systematic language acquisition’ and it is 
the first stage in explaining the acquisition of meaning. 
 
I suggested that this process is subconscious, which raises the possibility, to be kept 
in mind as I examine how adults express and extract meaning, that there are similar 
subconscious processes involved in the linguistic behaviour of adults.  It also appears likely 
that these processes are modular. Carruthers argues for three basic elements in the language 
faculty: comprehension, production and a common database (Carruthers 2006 pp 186ff). 
But within each of these areas there may well be distinct modules. I will return to this issue 
in a later chapter. 
 
In the meantime, I emphasise that systematic language acquisition appears to 
provide an explanation for the acquisition of the meaning of grammatical terms by children. 
In the next two chapters I consider how children acquire the semantic elements of their 
vocabulary. 
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CHAPTER 4: OSTENSIVE LANGUAGE ACQUISITION 
 
Case 2 
  Johnny is a 4-year old boy who attends a nursery class. One day he 
goes with a teacher and a small group of pupils on a nature walk. During 
the walk Johnny hears the teacher say "Look! There’s a red poppy”. When 
Johnny looks in the direction that the teacher was pointing, the red thing 
that catches his eye is a red admiral butterfly. He therefore associates the 
word ‘poppy’ with this object. 
  When Johnny gets home he discusses his day with his mother. “I saw 
a red poppy”, he says. His mother is distracted and just says “That was 
nice, dear”, having misunderstood what he was trying to tell her. 
 
In the previous chapter I began to discuss the ways in which children acquire 
language and thereby meaning. I cited evidence that children acquire a portion of their 
vocabulary by associating terms heard in various utterances with innate concepts.  
 
In this chapter I look at the way in which children begin to acquire and use terms 
that relate to their environment. I point out that this process of language acquisition is not 
the same in all cultures, although there are underlying similarities. I draw a distinction 
between the processes for learning terms for physical objects and terms for properties, 
actions and events. I discuss Quine’s view on these processes and suggest that in the latter 
case he is wrong. 
 
 After a discussion about the problem of error, I outline a very influential view 
about meaning – that of Paul Grice. I review criticisms to this view of meaning made by 
Putnam and Searle, before suggesting another criticism that could be made based on 
Johnny’s experience. I end by concluding that, despite these criticisms, Grice’s approach is 
correct – but only within a narrowly defined scope. 
4.1 Learning the names of objects 
 
In this section I consider what Johnny’s experience reveals about the process by 
which young children begin to acquire and use vocabulary relating to their physical 
environment. I have already shown in the previous chapter that they have an innate 
awareness of, and the ability to acquire, language. My concern here, and in the following 
section, is how that ability actually operates in developing an initial semantic vocabulary, 
that is, in learning the meaning of terms relating to the environment. 
 
When Johnny heard his teacher say “Look! There’s a red poppy”, he knew that she 
was giving a name to some feature in the immediate environment. It was a natural process, 
part of his innate language faculty, for him to associate the sounds of the name “poppy” 
with such an object. The only problem was that he associated it with the wrong object. 
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It is tempting to think that the way that young children begin acquiring a vocabulary 
is not simply ostensive, but is deliberately ostensive. We think of Mum and Dad pointing 
out people and objects to the child and at the same time making a sound. As a result, a 
representation of the sounds forming the term becomes linked in the child’s mind with a 
perceptual representation (either via a single modality such as vision, or combining several 
modalities). This link is strengthened by repetition until the child automatically associates 
terms such as ‘mummy’, ‘daddy’ or ‘spoon’ with what they represent and thereby acquires 
their meaning. 
 
The process of creating a link between the representation of a term and the 
representation of an object when both are perceived simultaneously is an example of the 
procedure known as “Hebbian learning”. This has been described as “cells that fire 
together, wire together” (Robertson 1999 p 13). It is not essentially different from the 
mechanism whereby Pavlov’s dogs learned to salivate at the sound of a bell. The significant 
fact in the case of children and language is the innate recognition of the role of language 
(see the previous chapter).  
 
However, linguistic studies have shown that this pattern of parental involvement is 
not universal. Shirley Brice Heath studied the upbringing of children in three neighbour-
hoods of a city in the south east of the United States of America. She found that in one of 
these communities children were left to pick up language by their own efforts, simply by 
being exposed to the language of adults. There was no parent to child language teaching, 
and the child’s attempts to replicate language were ignored until the child reached the stage 
of being able to intervene in adult conversations. (Heath 1994 pp 84-87)  
 
Although in this situation there is no deliberate ostensive learning of new terms, the 
process still requires simultaneity in the perception of the sounds that constitute the name of 
an object and the perception of the object.  The process would seem to involve 
remembering this pattern of coincidence until over a period of time the consistent link 
between sound and object is recognised. There appear to be good reasons for assuming that 
this is a modular process and that it is subconscious, but a defence of this view is beyond 
the scope of this study.  I will term this style of language acquisition ‘quasi-ostensive’, and 
unless the context dictates otherwise, future references to ostensive language acquisition 
should be taken to include quasi-ostensive acquisition.  
 
The process of ostensive language acquisition has been described by Quine in the 
following terms. 
 
 
We can account in this way for the power that the sound of the word 'dog' 
has to draw our attention to a dog that we would have otherwise 
overlooked. The account is as follows: a trace survives of a past episode of 
impingement from which we learned the word; an episode, that, in which 
the creature was vividly seen and the word heard. The present episode of 
impingements resembles that one in part, namely in the sound of the word. 
Consequently the trace of the past episode enhances the salience of other 
points of resemblance, and lo the dog. (Quine 1974 pp 26-27) Mind, Meaning and Miscommunication 
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In Johnny’s case the sound was associated with the wrong object, that is the link 
from the representation of the term “poppy” was made to a visual representation of a 
butterfly in contrast with the link intended by the teacher to (Johnny’s visual representation 
of) a poppy. 
 
This link between the representation of a term and a perceptual representation of an 
object applies to all modalities. It is not important for our current purposes whether there is 
a single combined representation of all the relevant perceptions (visual, auditory, tactile, 
etc) or whether there are separate perceptual representations that are linked in some way. 
The point at issue is that the representation of the term is linked to one or more perceptual 
representations. 
 
It perhaps needs to be emphasised that there is no direct link created between the 
representation of the word and the actual object in the real world to which the word relates. 
The link between term and meaning is purely conventional – it cannot be passed to the 
child as some sort of attachment to the word. When children learn new terms, the link from 
term to object is via the perceptual representation of that object, as shown in the following 
diagram (where red indicates sensory perceptions, blue the link from representation of term 
to object via the perceptual representation of that object, and green the conventional link 
between word and object). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.1 Links between term and object 
 
 
In this section I discussed how children begin to learn the meaning of terms related 
to objects within their environment. In many communities parents and others point to 
objects and simultaneously speak their name, so that children learn the terms ostensively.  
In other communities the children are left to acquire such terms by repeated association of 
term and object in the speech of their elders. In either case the process is one aspect of the 
child’s innate language ability and results in a link being created between the representation 
of the term and the representation of the object, and thereby the object itself.  
4.2 Learning about properties, actions and events 
 
Children do not only learn the meaning of terms for objects: they also at an early 
stage acquire terms of properties, actions and events. In this section I limit my discussion to 
learning the names of properties; I assume that a similar case can be made for other entities 
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such as actions and events. I am also assuming that properties exist, without any 
commitment to a particular ontological theory. I claim that Quine’s explanation for how 
property terms are acquired is wrong, and that the process is in essence the same as that for 
objects. 
 
The process of learning terms described in the previous section does not only apply 
to objects. As a parent I have observed the same process at work for events, for actions and 
for properties. One of the earliest games I played with my elder son used his coloured 
bricks. “Bring me a red brick”, I would say, or “Bring me a yellow brick”, and he was soon 
getting it right every time.  
 
Quine suggests a quite different process for learning the term for a property such as 
‘red’. He suggests that in the natural course of babbling (see Pinker 1994 pp 265-266) a 
child may produce the sounds making up ‘red’ and that this might coincide with the 
presence of something red in their vicinity. The parent rewards the child in some way for 
this match between their babbling and their surroundings and the pleasure of this 
experience prompts the child to try and repeat it. Further utterances of the sound ‘red’ when 
red objects are present also bring approval and reinforce the link, until the child acquires 
the term ‘red’. (Quine 1974 p 29). 
 
This claim appears to fly in the face of both common sense and empirical evidence.  
The chances of a child’s babble forming the word ‘red’ simultaneously with the presence of 
a red object in the vicinity and simultaneously with the attention of a parent to applaud the 
coincidence seem extremely remote. Furthermore, as the study by Shirley Brice Heath 
revealed (see above), in some communities children’s attempts at language are ignored 
until they are speaking properly. 
 
There seems to be no obvious reason to suggest a substantially different mechanism 
for acquiring the meaning of property terms to that used to acquire the names of objects. In 
the latter case the child recognises a repeated match between the perception of an object 
and the perception of a sound, either in the course of deliberate adult to child conversation 
or by listening to adult to adult conversation. In the case of properties the child perceives a 
repeated match between the perception of a sound and several different objects and 
recognises some property that the objects have in common. In both cases the repeated 
matching results in the acquisition of meaning for the term involved. 
 
In the case of objects the representation of a term for an object is, I have claimed, 
linked to a perceptual representation of that object. Since properties are features that are 
common to many objects, there is no common perceptual representation. Whilst a detailed 
defence of my view is not possible within the scope of this thesis, it is my assumption that 
the process discussed above of recognising a property involves the formation of a concept 
and thus a conceptual representation. Since I have already suggested, in the previous 
chapter, that the representations of syntactical terms are linked to innate concepts, ie 
conceptual representations, I will use the term ‘perceptual concepts’ for concepts derived 
from perceptions. 
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In this and the preceding section, I have outlined the process by which children 
acquire that part of their vocabulary that relates to their immediate environment: a process 
that went awry in the case of Johnny and the ‘poppy’. Because Johnny associated his 
perceptual representation of a red admiral butterfly with a term having a different meaning 
in his communal language, he failed to transmit successfully the information that he 
intended to convey. Even though his mother understood the meaning of the utterance, she 
failed to grasp Johnny's intention.   
 
One philosophical approach to meaning – that of Paul Grice – derives meaning from 
intention. It is therefore appropriate at this point to review this approach and to consider 
what this case of miscommunication tells us about it, but before doing so I need to face up 
to the problem of error. 
4.3 The Causal Theory of Representation and the problem of error 
 
Although I have not accepted Fodor’s concept of Mentalese in full, I have assumed 
a causal relationship between an object that is perceived and its perceptual representation 
(see section 1.4), and have also suggested that this perceptual representation might equate 
to what Fodor terms a “Mentalese symbol”. In broad terms therefore my approach matches 
what Fodor has termed the “Crude Causal Theory” of representation (Fodor 2005 p 225). 
The charge most commonly made against any causal theory is that it cannot accommodate 
error. 
 
It is not my intention to provide a definitive answer to this charge, but simply to 
note that I am assuming that an answer can be made in line with Fodor’s own attempt at an 
answer. The problem to be addressed is not that of Johnny’s experience, which involved 
error at the stage of learning the name of an object. Rather, the “problem of error” is the 
problem that occurs after a term has been used correctly and is then misused.  
 
To illustrate the problem, let us assume that Johnny in due course learns the term 
‘horse’ and can correctly respond with it whenever he encounters a horse.  However, one 
evening he sees a cow in the distance and responds with the word “horse”. How are we to 
show that this is an error, and that the term ‘horse’ (at least in Johnny’s idiolect) does not 
mean “horse or cow”? Fodor argues that the answer is to be found in the semantic 
relationship between the object (horse) and its representation in the mind (ibid pp 230-232).  
Johnny’s use of the term ‘horse’ when seeing a cow can be explained as a mistake because 
that term is regularly used by the speech community for a particular type of quadruped. By 
contrast, it cannot be explained by the use by the speech community of the term ‘cow’ 
applied to cows. It is this asymmetry of semantic relationship that explains why error does 
not negate the causal theory of representation. 
 
Whilst not claiming that this is a full answer to the problem of error (see for 
example Miller 1998 pp 190-196), it is my assumption for the purposes of this thesis that 
the problem does not invalidate the broadly causal approach to meaning that I am adopting. Mind, Meaning and Miscommunication 
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4.4 Grice on meaning 
 
In this section I look at some of the issues raised by Grice’s 1957 article entitled 
Meaning. I begin by summarising Grice’s argument for the distinction between natural and 
non-natural meaning. I then outline his claim for the priority of explanation of meaning 
falling on individual utterances, before rehearsing his threefold exegesis of meaning. In the 
immediately following section I discuss several criticisms of Grice’s approach. 
4.4.1 Natural and Non-Natural Meaning 
 
In his article Grice draws a distinction between “natural meaning” (which he refers to 
as meaningN) and “non-natural meaning” (meaningNN). An example of natural meaning 
provided by Grice is the presence of spots on a measles sufferer (Grice 2001a p 92). The 
spots meanN that the person has measles: one cannot say, points out Grice, “Those spots 
mean measles, but he has not got measles” (although one could say “I thought those spots 
meant measles but I was wrong”) (ibid). 
 
An example of non-natural meaning would be a blue flashing light. I might say: 
“There is a blue flashing light ahead; that means an emergency vehicle”. I could say this 
because there is a convention in this country that a blue flashing light on a vehicle indicates 
an emergency vehicle. I could however be placed in the position of having to say “A blue 
flashing light means an emergency vehicle, but there is no emergency vehicle, it is a boy 
with a blue torch, which he is turning on and off”. 
 
Grice’s first claim, then, is that communication involves non-natural meaning. His 
second claim concerns where the priority lies in explaining meaning, and that is the subject 
of the following section. 
4.4.2 Explanatory priority 
 
Grice makes reference to what he terms “causal theories” of meaning, which locate 
meaning in what Stevenson had called “an elaborate process of conditioning attending the 
use of the sign in communication” (ibid p 93). In essence, this means that a speaker selects 
the terms forming his or her utterance based on the general use of those terms by the 
language community. Grice rejects this view, and argues that it is the intention of the 
speaker in individual utterances that must be explained first and that communal meaning 
derives from individual meaning.  
 
This is how Grice sums up his argument: 
 
 
No provision is made [in the causal theory] for dealing with statements 
about what a particular speaker or writer means by a sign on a particular 
occasion (which may well diverge from the standard meaning of the sign); 
nor is it obvious how the theory could be adapted to make such provision. 
One might even go further in criticism and maintain that the causal theory Mind, Meaning and Miscommunication 
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ignores the fact that the meaning (in general) of a sign needs to be 
explained in terms of what users of the sign do (or should) mean by it on 
particular occasions; and so the latter notion, which is unexplained by the 
causal theory, is in fact the fundamental one. (ibid p 94) 
 
 
So for Grice a theory of meaning must explain meaning in individual utterances 
first, and use that to explain meaning in the general communications of the speech 
community. I return to this point in section 4.4 below, after I review how Grice 
summarised his theory of meaning. 
 
4.4.3 Grice’s theory of meaning 
 
Grice does not limit his analysis of meaningful utterances to language but includes 
other behaviour that is intended to communicate. Many of the examples of utterances that he 
uses to defend his view of meaning are in fact non-verbal, and I will not review them here. I 
will apply, and criticise, his theory of meaning solely in relation to verbal utterances.  
 
Grice begins with the idea that “ ‘x meantNN something’ would be true if x was 
intended by its utterer to induce a belief in some ‘audience’” (ibid p 94). But after finding 
several faults with this simple explanation he extends it to include a requirement that the 
audience recognise that this is the speaker’s intention. He therefore ends up by asserting that 
“ ‘A meantNN something by x’ is roughly equivalent to ‘A uttered x with the intention of 
producing a belief by means of the recognition of this intention’ ” (ibid p 95).  
 
In the preceding paragraphs I have summarised the main points of Grice’s article on 
Meaning, noting (i) his distinction between natural and non-natural meaning, (ii) his claim 
that individual utterances have explanatory priority over general community usage and (iii) 
his summing up of non-natural meaning in utterances. The first of these points is non-
controversial, but the latter two will be discussed in the following section. 
4.5 Some alleged flaws in Grice’s analysis 
 
In this section I outline some alleged flaws in Grice’s analysis. After a brief 
reference to objections by Putnam and Searle, I make a further objection based on Johnny’s 
experience.  
 
4.5.1 Putnam’s objection 
 
In a famous article in 1973 Putnam attacked Grice’s claim that meaning is to be 
located in the intentions of the utterer. He produced a thought experiment in which the term 
‘water’ is used on this earth to refer to one substance (ie H2O), but on an otherwise identical 
planet called ‘Twin Earth’ is used to refer to a different substance (to which he gives the 
formula XYZ) (Putnam 2001 p 289).  
 
It was Putnam’s aim to demonstrate that two people (one on Earth and one on Twin 
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yet the meaning of that term differ between the two cases. Both speakers intended to refer 
to the substance that fills rivers and lakes, and the drinking of which is essential to life: but 
they are two distinct substances. Putnam sums up his claim by saying “Cut the pie any way 
you like, ‘meanings’ just ain’t in the head!” (ibid p 291). 
 
Putnam goes on to claim that the meaning of terms is determined by the linguistic 
community, and that the community often delegate the tasks to specialists (ibid p 292). He 
points out that individuals may learn a term such as “gold” and recognise items that are 
made of gold; nevertheless, individuals may be wrong. It is the expert who determines what 
is, and is not, gold. 
 
So Putnam’s objection to Grice is that the latter is wrong to locate meaning in the 
intentions of the utterer; meaning, says Putnam, is determined by the environment and the 
linguistic community.  
 
4.5.2 Searle’s objection 
 
Searle also attacks Grice’s link between meaning and intention, but from a different 
angle. He claims in a 1965 article that Grice fails to “show the connection between one’s 
meaning something by what one says and what that which one says actually means in the 
language” (Searle 2005 p 189). He illustrates this point with a simple thought experiment. 
 
An American soldier in World War II is captured by Italians. He speaks the only 
words of German that he knows, hoping that his captors will identify his words as German 
and draw the conclusion that he is a German officer. The words he speaks, taken from a 
German song, actually mean “Do you know the land where the lemon trees bloom?”, but 
the intentional meaning in the mind of the speaker is “I am a German officer” (ibid pp 189-
190).  In this situation, argues Searle, there is a clear difference between what the speaker 
intended the hearers to understand, and what the utterance actually means. 
 
Searle returned to this distinction in a later article discussing indirect speech acts. 
These are speech acts which are expressed in one form whilst meaning something else. For 
example, a question “Can you reach the salt?” may in fact be meant as a request to pass the 
salt. Searle says that “in hints, insinuations, irony and metaphor – to mention a few 
examples – the speaker’s utterance meaning and the sentence meaning come apart” (Searle 
2001 p 176). 
 
Searle’s objection to Grice is, at least in part, that Grice is wrong to locate meaning 
solely within the intentions of the utterer. Instead, a distinction is to be made between two 
different types of meaning: “utterer’s meaning” and “utterance meaning”. I will return to 
this point in a later chapter. In the meantime I will examine what might be considered a 
further flaw in Grice’s approach. Mind, Meaning and Miscommunication 
32 
4.5.3 A further objection 
 
The reason that Johnny failed to express to his mother the meaning that he intended 
to express is that he had failed to use the correct term, recognised by the speech 
community, for the object about which he was speaking. This could be seen as a further 
flaw in Grice’s approach: he fails to explain how the utterer acquired the term(s) that he 
uses to express his meaning. As a general rule we must acquire terms and their meanings, in 
the ways already discussed (and the further way to be considered in the following chapter) 
before we can use them to communicate our intentions to others. 
 
It appears therefore that there are three criticisms of Grice’s attempt to explain 
meaning: 
 
  Meaning is determined by the external environment and the linguistic community, not 
the intentions of the individual 
 
  In some types of utterance, there is a difference between the intended meaning of the 
utterer and the meaning of the utterance 
 
  Grice fails to explain how the utterer acquired the meaning of the terms used to express 
his intentions. 
 
However, I shall now argue that if we carefully define the context in which to apply 
Grice’s approach to meaning we find it answers the serious question of how terms come to 
mean what they mean in the first place. 
4.6 The creation of new terms 
 
The issue that has been overlooked in the discussion so far is how terms come into 
existence. Why do we call a chair a ‘chair’, and why is a dog a ‘dog’? This is not the place 
for a discussion of how language began, but it is appropriate to review briefly the way in 
which new terms (or new uses of existing terms) enter a language. The following 
explanation is, I believe, non-controversial. 
 
Someone discovers a new object or property, or intuits a new class of objects or 
properties, or perceives a distinction that has not previously been made. In order to express 
this new meaning the person concerned must either create a new term, or add a new senseD 
to an existing term. They must then use that term in an utterance in such a way that the 
utteree(s) can allocate meaning to the term concerned. 
 
Until recent decades it would have been necessary for a new term to have been used 
in utterances on repeated occasions until the term became a recognised part of the language. 
With the explosion of communication in the recent past in all forms of media it may well be 
sufficient for the term to be uttered once if (a) the utterer has sufficient influence and (b) 
the utterance has a sufficiently large audience (such as items in tabloid newspapers).  
 Mind, Meaning and Miscommunication 
33 
This process of introducing new terms to the language is precisely what is described 
by Grice. His insistence on locating meaning in the intentions of the utterer, and making 
individual utterances the explanatory priority, is fully justified in the case of neologisms. 
Grice suggests that three steps are needed to explain meaning (using x to represent the 
utterance and A the utterer) (Grice 2001a p 95). These are elucidating the meaning of: 
 
(i)  x meant something (on one particular occasion) 
(ii)  A meant something by x (on some particular occasion) 
(iii)  x means something (generally) or A means something by x (generally) 
 
If we understand the first of these three steps as relating to the very first time that a 
neologism is coined, then we have a very clear explanation in Grice’s approach of how 
terms acquire their meaning. What it does not explain, nor set out to explain, is how we 
acquire the meaning of terms that someone else created. 
4.7 Conclusion 
 
In this chapter I used a simple thought experiment (which draws heavily on my own 
experience of teaching and working with young children) to examine how children begin to 
acquire meaning.  I showed how the process is ostensive and relates not only to objects in 
the child’s environment but also to other features such as properties. In doing so, I rejected 
Quine’s analysis regarding the learning of the name of properties, whilst concurring with 
his explanation for the learning of the names of objects. 
 
I outlined Grice’s account of meaning and raised three objections to it as a general 
explanation of meaning. I accepted, however, that Grice’s approach is relevant to the 
process of introducing new terms into the language. I now turn, in the following chapter, to 
the issue of how we learn the meaning of terms that deal with matters outside our 
environment (eg abstract terms such ‘freedom’ or ‘philosophy’, and terms for objects and 
properties of which we have no personal experience). Mind, Meaning and Miscommunication 
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CHAPTER 5: INDIRECT LANGUAGE ACQUISITION 
 
Case 3 
  A Sunday School teacher was telling her young pupils the story of 
Adam and Eve. She explained how Eve was tempted by a snake to eat the 
forbidden fruit, and how as a result God drove both Adam and Eve out of 
the Garden of Eden. When she finished the story she gave out paper and 
crayons and told the children to draw the story. At the end of the lesson 
she looked at all the pictures and was very disappointed with one of 
them. Most of the children had drawn Adam and Eve, some included a 
tree, some included fruit and others a serpent. But Mary had drawn a 
large motor car. 
  The teacher said to Mary “I asked you to draw the story of Adam 
and Eve”. “I know, Miss,” replied Mary. “You said that God drove 
Adam and Eve out of the garden. Look! There they are in the back seat of 
the car, and that is God in the front seat, driving them.” 
 
In this chapter I complete the analysis of how children acquire their vocabulary and 
thereby the meaning of terms. I begin with a distinction made by Russell between 
knowledge “by acquaintance” and knowledge “by description”. Using an alternative 
definition of Russell’s terms, I then discuss how children learn terms by description and how 
this relates to the other processes described in the preceding chapters. After a discussion of 
the relationship between the vocabulary of Mentalese and the vocabulary of our communal 
language, I turn to the problem of terms with more than one meaning.  
5.1 Russell on knowledge 
 
In this section I summarise what Russell says about knowledge by acquaintance and 
knowledge by description and about the relationship between them. I suggest that this is 
critical to an understanding of how we acquire the major part of our vocabulary, although I 
propose a modification to Russell’s definition of the two terms. 
 
It is a central question in the philosophy of mind as to whether, and how, we can be 
aware of the real world. In his The Problems of Philosophy Bertrand Russell draws a 
distinction between knowledge by acquaintance and knowledge by description (Russell 
1999 pp 31ff). He claims that we cannot know by acquaintance objects in the outside 
world, but only the sense data that derive from them. He therefore places our knowledge of 
the world around us into the category of knowledge by description.  
 
Russell’s distinction is between two routes by which we acquire knowledge, and a 
similar distinction can be made about the way that we acquire terms and their meanings. 
Language acquisition “by acquaintance” is what I have discussed in the previous chapter; 
the focus is now on language acquisition “by description”. I part from Russell, however, in 
where I draw the boundary between these two routes to knowledge. 
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It seems unnecessary, and indeed questionable, to regard our knowledge of objects 
and other entities perceived via our sense data as knowledge by description.  In order to 
make the distinction with knowledge by acquaintance it might perhaps be appropriate to 
coin the phrase “knowledge by assumption” to cover the existence of objects in the real 
world that we assume because of the sense data they are thought to cause. However, for the 
purpose of understanding how we acquire meaning, it is more appropriate to use a single 
term to cover our knowledge both of the sense data and of their causes. 
 
I therefore take Russell’s term “knowledge by acquaintance” and apply it to all 
terms whose meaning is acquired ostensively, that is where terms relate either to perceptual 
representations of objects or perceptual concepts of other entities such as properties. In this 
chapter I am concerned with how we acquire knowledge of, and the language about, entities 
for which we have no perceptual representations; that is, what I encompass within the term 
“knowledge by description”. I do not refer just to terms whose meaning we acquire by a 
formal description, but to all terms whose meaning is learned via language and not by 
personal experience. 
 
Russell emphasises that knowledge by description does not require any personal 
experience of the object concerned. I know, for example, that “the Member of Parliament 
for my constituency” exists even though I do not know whether the person concerned is 
male or female, their name, their age, or anything else about them. When children begin the 
formal process of education (whether at home, at nursery, or at school) they begin to learn 
by description. It is perhaps one of the main features that differentiates humans from other 
animals that the greatest part of our knowledge is acquired through education, that is by 
description. 
 
Russell ends the chapter in which he sets out this important distinction with a claim 
that I believe is just as strong in the case of my wider definition of “knowledge by 
acquaintance” as it is for Russell’s narrower definition. He says: 
 
 
The chief importance of knowledge by description is that it enables us to 
pass beyond the limits of our private experience. In spite of the fact that 
we can only know truths which are wholly composed of terms which we 
have experienced in acquaintance, we can yet have knowledge by 
description of things which we have never experienced. (ibid p 40) 
 
 
This statement by Russell is, I will suggest in the following section, the clue to 
understanding how we acquire the meaning of terms for objects, or other matters of which 
we have no direct experience.   
5.2 Indirect language acquisition 
 
With my modification to Russell’s distinction in mind, I now turn to the 
misunderstanding between Mary and her Sunday School teacher. I will suggest one cause Mind, Meaning and Miscommunication 
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of the misunderstanding (another will be looked at in section 5.4), and from that suggest 
how the meaning of terms acquired by description be understood. 
 
Had Mary lived two centuries earlier, she would have been directly acquainted with 
the common practice of driving animals to market. Instead, Mary acquired the term “drive” 
by direct acquisition, by being driven by her parents. Although “drive” does not name an 
object, it does describe a recognisable action, similar to terms such as “jump” or “walk”, 
and its meaning could therefore be acquired ostensively. Mary could have acquired the 
earlier senseD of ‘drive’ by description, if her parents had told her about the former practice 
or if she had learned about it in school or had looked up the term ‘drive’ in a dictionary.  
 
As we grow older, an increasing percentage of our total vocabulary relates to 
matters about which we have learned by description. The question that this raises is how 
such terms are linked to the subjects to which they relate, and Russell’s statement at the end 
of the preceding section provides us with the clue. 
 
For every term used to describe the meaning of a word to us, there must be a chain 
of meaning that ends with a word we learned either by systematic language acquisition (see 
section 3.4) or by direct acquaintance (see chapter 4) That is, there must exist a link from 
the representation in our mind for each term used in the description to either a perceptual 
representation or a conceptual representation.  
 
This order of acquisition, ostensive followed by description, accords both with 
common sense and with empirical evidence. Brown tells us that “the vocabulary of young 
children typically exhibits a preponderance of words for concrete objects over words for 
abstractions and relations” (cited in Fodor, 1975, p 177). The diagram below illustrates this 
mechanism in a very simplified form (ignoring the presence of both grammatical terms and 
related innate concepts within the chain of meaning linkages). 
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To illustrate this process consider the following conversation: 
 
CHILD  Daddy, what is a mountain? 
 
FATHER  A mountain is a very, very big hill. 
 
It might be said that understanding the meaning of terms learned by description 
seems easy in the case of concepts that match our previous experience but does not explain 
how we grasp either the immense (such as galaxies and universes) or the minute (atoms and 
quarks). Quine discusses this problem in his Word and Object where he suggests that we do 
so by analogy (Quine 1960 pp 13-17). 
 
Within our experience we have perceived large round objects such as beach balls and 
small round objects such as tennis balls and smaller round objects such as marbles. I 
proposed in section 3.3 that comparison is part of the innate language of thought and we 
therefore perceive the comparison in size between these three items even before we acquire 
the terms large and small and their cognates. By extending the comparison in size we can 
understand that the moon is many times bigger than a beach ball, and that an atom is many 
times smaller than a pea. 
 
It might be claimed that technical and scientific terms are not learned by description 
in the manner I have described, but rather as part of a theory. For example, I come to grasp 
the meaning of ‘boson’, ‘hadron’, ‘lepton’ and similar terms only by grasping, at least to 
some extent, quantum theory. It may well be true that I cannot grasp the meaning of 
‘hadron’ by description in isolation, since any description is likely to use other technical 
terms such as ‘lepton’. Nevertheless, it remains true that new terms can only be acquired, 
whether in isolation or as a ‘package deal’, building on the foundation of terms that are 
already understood. 
 
With this analysis of how we acquire the meaning of terms for matters of which we 
have no direct experience I complete the study of the various ways in which we acquire 
meaning. These can be summarised as: 
 
(i)  by matching terms to already existing innate concepts (for example, 
grammatical terms); 
 
(ii)  by matching terms to perceptual representations or to concepts formed from 
perceptions (that is, ostensive learning: knowledge “by acquaintance”); 
 
(iii)  by matching terms to descriptions couched in terms acquired via either route 
(i) or (ii) (that is, knowledge “by description”). 
 
Before considering another reason for the misunderstanding between Mary and her 
teacher, I will return to the subject of Mentalese and to the elements that constitute its 
vocabulary. Mind, Meaning and Miscommunication 
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5.3 The vocabulary of Mentalese 
 
In this section I will discuss the possibility that language acquired by description 
forms a major part of the vocabulary, not just of our native tongue, but also of the inner 
language of Mentalese. I will suggest that if it does so, this explains both the widespread 
idea that we think in our communal language, and the problem of explaining how 
Mentalese terms relate to matters of which we have no experience. 
 
In Chapter 3 I put forward the view that Mentalese requires a very small initial 
vocabulary, limited to a few basic concepts and some relational terms (see section 3.3 
above).  I discussed the case of languageless (that is LOS-less) adults who nevertheless 
demonstrated their ability to think, and I argued that for them it was their perceptual and 
conceptual representations which, together with the previously outlined basic innate 
concepts, formed the vocabulary of their internal language. Since it is clear that children are 
able to think long before they acquire spoken (or signed) language, the same must be true 
of them, unless we accept Fodor’s view (Fodor 1975 pp 124ff) that we are born with a 
fully-formed innate vocabulary adequate to represent all human experience. 
 
Although I reject Fodor’s extensive innate vocabulary for the language of thought, I 
do agree with his dismissal of the idea that all our thinking is carried out using our 
communal language (Fodor 1975 p 56). It is, I suggest, possible for us to think “where did I 
leave my keys? Ah there they are on the sideboard” without actually expressing these 
thoughts in our communal language. This is because all the ingredients of that thought are 
either innate concepts (see section 3.3) or perceptual representations (section 1.4).   
 
However, this is clearly not possible when we come to terms that have been learned 
“by description”. When I want to think about ‘philosophy’ and the problem of 
‘intentionality’ I have no perceptual representations available to me, but some form of 
description (see figure 5.1 above). It might be that in these circumstances it is more 
economical for the representation of the term rather than the representation of the 
description to form part of the internal vocabulary of thought. This would explain our 
experience of thinking in our communal language. 
 
If my analysis is correct, then the majority of the vocabulary of our Language of 
Thought when we are adults is, in fact, also the vocabulary of our native language. There is 
therefore no conflict between the arguments evinced by Fodor for the existence of a 
language of thought and the experience of myself, and many others, of thinking in our 
natural language. Both languages, I suggest, share the major part of their vocabulary. 
5.4 Words with multiple senses 
 
The communicative failure between Mary and her Sunday School teacher was not 
simply caused by her failure to acquire a term by description. It was compounded by the 
fact that the term concerned, in common with a significant proportion of her language’s 
vocabulary, has more than one senseD. I now turn, therefore, to consider the implications of 
this fact for our understanding of meaning. Mind, Meaning and Miscommunication 
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In Chapter 3 I referred to Carruther’s view that the language faculty in the human 
mind comprises three elements: comprehension, production and a common database 
(Carruthers 2006 pp 186ff). Whether there is a specific area of the brain in which the words 
that we know are stored is not relevant: the fact is that they do exist in our memory and it is 
convenient to consider the totality of that part of our memory as a database. What is not 
known is whether, in the case of terms with more than one meaning (or in the case of 
homonyms), there is a single entry with multiple links (one to each meaning) or multiple 
entries.  
 
There is an obvious potential for misunderstanding between utterer and utteree 
whichever of these arrangements is, in fact, correct. One arrangement would be 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure5.2: Terms with single representation and multiple meanings 
 
 
The alternative arrangement would be as follows: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure5.3: Terms with multiple representation and multiple meanings 
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If he meant Concept A, there remains a risk of miscommunication: the extent of 
that risk will depend upon the contextual evidence available to the utteree to make 
their selection between the available links  
 
It will be seen that regardless of how the brain actually organises the storage in 
memory of terms and the links from terms to meanings, there is a serious risk of 
misunderstanding when terms have multiple meanings. This issue will be returned to in a 
later chapter (section 11.3).  
5.5 Conclusion 
 
In this chapter I brought to a conclusion the subject of how we learn new terms, and 
thus acquire their meaning, by looking at what can be termed “knowledge by description”. 
Following Russell I argued that we acquire the meaning of terms learned in this way (which 
accounts for the largest part of our vocabulary) by linking the description of these terms to 
terms that we have previously acquired either through a small innate vocabulary or by 
ostensive learning. 
 
I suggested that the internal language of thought and the spoken or signed language 
that we acquire from our speech community share a significant proportion of their 
vocabulary: that is, the vocabulary acquired by description. This explains how thought is 
possible without language, whilst recognising that for many, if not most, of us our 
conscious thinking often uses the vocabulary of our native language. 
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CHAPTER 6: SENSE, REFERENCE AND CONNOTATION 
Case 4 
  A young couple are out for a stroll one summer evening. The young 
man, an astronomy student, says to his girlfriend, “Look, darling, do you 
see the planet Venus there?” “No,” she replies, “but I can see the Evening 
Star”. 
 
Case 5 
  The young Christian minister finished his training and went to work 
in the East End of the city among the homeless, the drug addicts and the 
alcoholics. He was conscious of his good fortune in having a happy 
childhood with loving parents and longed to bring help and comfort to 
those less fortunate than himself. Week after week he preached about the 
Father God to whom they could turn in their desperation and need. And 
week after week he got no response. Until one day he was talking to one of 
the men after his sermon, who said to him “If your Father God is anything 
like my father, then I want nothing to do with him!”.  
 
In the previous four chapters I have looked at the way in which we acquire the 
meaning of terms and have identified three different mechanisms that are involved in that 
process. In so doing I have focussed on that one aspect of meaning that is generally denoted 
by philosophers as referenceF: the terms learned have referred to some entity in the world 
(via the perceptual or conceptual representation of that entity). 
 
There remain, however, two other aspects of the meaning we attach to terms that we 
learn that need to be considered. In this chapter I look first, therefore, at the distinction 
drawn by Frege between referenceF and senseF. Then, after noting objections to Frege’s 
distinction made by Putnam, I turn to the issue of connotation, using this term in its regular 
non-philosophical senseD. This completes Part Two on the acquisition of meaning. 
6.1 Frege on sense and reference 
 
In an 1892 article Frege sets out an important distinction. Since he wrote in German, 
the terms he uses are “Sinn” and “Bedeutung” which are most commonly translated into 
English by contemporary philosophers as “sense” and “reference”. Two points should be 
noted. First, the German word “Bedeutung” is most commonly rendered in English as 
“meaning”, and we perhaps lose some of the force of Frege’s views by talking of 
“reference” rather than “meaning”. Second, in the translation from which I have taken my 
quotations, the word “Bedeutung” is translated as “nominatum”, perhaps to avoid confusion 
with the other uses of the terms “meaning” and “reference” both in general English and in 
the philosophy of language. 
 
Frege begins the explanation of this distinction with a mathematical example.  Draw 
three lines (a, b and c) from the apices of a triangle to the midpoints of the opposite sides, Mind, Meaning and Miscommunication 
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he tells us. We then have a point where a intersects with b, and a point where a intersects 
with c. However, these are in fact the same point, even though described differently, that is 
“the intersection of a and b” and “the intersection of a and c” have a common referenceF. 
Frege then relates this to language by saying that the “nominata of ‘evening star’ and 
‘morning star’ are the same but not their senses”. (Frege 2001 p 200) 
 
The phrases ‘the morning star’ and ‘the evening star’ refer to a celestial body whose 
reflected light appears in the early morning and late evening respectively, close to the sun. 
In fact what is seen on both occasions is the planet Venus. Using Frege’s terminology, 
“morning star” and “evening star” have distinct senseFs but both refer to the planet Venus. 
In the example given at the beginning of this chapter, the young lady is aware of the senseF 
‘evening star’ and can identify it in the sky, but is ignorant of its referenceF, that is that the 
evening star is the planet Venus. For her, the term ‘the evening star’ does not mean (that is, 
refer to) Venus, even though she is aware that there exists a planet called Venus. 
 
Frege goes further, and points out that there can be senseFs that have no referenceF. 
He gives two examples. He says that the words ‘the heavenly body which has the greatest 
distance from the earth’ have a senseF but it is very doubtful whether they have a 
referenceF. Then returning to mathematics, he says that the expression ‘the series with the 
least convergence’ has a senseF, but it can be proved that is has no referenceF. (ibid) 
 
There is clear potential for miscommunication in this situation.  Person A may 
know the terms “the morning star” and “the evening star” and be able to point to the objects 
concerned in the sky at the appropriate time, without being aware that they are in fact the 
same celestial body. Person B may be aware that the terms refer to the same body, 
appearing at two different times, but not be aware that the body concerned is the planet 
Venus. Person C knows both terms but also knows that they both designate Venus. In this 
situation A, B and C have three different senseFs for the one term “the morning star” and 
thus it is not unreasonable to say that they each mean something different by this term. 
 
However, Putnam challenges the use of the term ‘meaning’ in this situation. I 
consider his views in the following section. 
6.2 Putnam on meaning 
 
In a 1974 article (expanding on an earlier paper) Putnam discusses the dichotomy in 
traditional views on meaning expressed by pairs of terms such as ‘extension’ and 
‘intension’, or ‘Sinn’ and ‘Bedeutung’.  It should be noted, however, that there is no 
complete match between these pairs of terms, so that for example Frege’s use of 
‘Bedeutung’ does not equate to Putnam’s use of ‘extension’, since, for example, for the 
former predicates are incomplete expressions. 
  
Putnam begins by reviewing the traditional view. He refers to the two terms 
“creature with a heart” and “creature with a kidney” and points out that, since every 
creature with a heart has a kidney, these two phrases have the same extension. In one sense 
therefore, it is claimed, they have the same meaning. However, having a heart is clearly Mind, Meaning and Miscommunication 
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different to having a kidney, so in another sense these two phrases have different meanings, 
that is different intensions. (Putnam 2005 p 191). 
 
Putnam then goes on to question the implications of this approach, saying: 
 
 
So theory of meaning came to rest on two unchallenged assumptions: 
1. That knowing the meaning of a term [in the sense of ‘intension’] is just 
a matter of being in a certain psychological state (in the sense of 
‘psychological state’ in which states of memory and psychological 
dispositions are ‘psychological states’; no one thought that knowing the 
meaning of a word was a continuous state of consciousness, of course). 
2. That the meaning of a term (in the senses of ‘intension’) determines its 
extension (in the sense that sameness of intension entails sameness of 
extension). 
I shall argue that these two assumptions are not jointly satisfied by any 
notion, let alone any notion of meaning. The traditional concept of 
meaning is a concept which rests on a false theory. (ibid p 192) 
 
 
To prove his point Putnam uses the thought experiment already discussed in section 
4.4.1 above. He claims that two people (one on Earth and one on Twin Earth) can be in the 
same psychological state (that is, have the same intension) yet be referring to two different 
things. In an earlier version of his paper, Putnam brings the argument nearer home by 
discussing his inability to distinguish between an elm tree and a beech tree.  He claims that 
in his idiolect ‘beech tree’ and ‘elm tree’ have different extensions (the set of all beech trees 
and the set of all elm trees respectively), but no difference in intension can be used to 
explain the distinction. (Putnam 2001 pp 290-291) 
 
Putnam’s claim is therefore that “‘meanings’ just ain’t in the head” (ibid p 291), that 
is that ‘meaning’ must be restricted to extension, ie referenceF. This claim is discussed in the 
following sections. 
6.3 Putnam’s view challenged 
 
In this section I raise the first of two objections to Putnam’s claim about the 
meaning of the term ‘meaning’. 
 
My first objection is that Putnam fails to deal adequately with the distinction that he 
uses to illustrate the classical view of meaning comprising both senseF and referenceF 
(intension and extension). He conceded that there is a difference between having a heart 
and having a kidney and that therefore there is a difference in meaning between “a creature 
with a heart”’ and “a creature with a kidney”. If we accept that this difference exists, and 
the fact that every creature with a heart is a creature with a kidney and vice versa, we 
cannot use the term extension to mark this difference. That term is already required for 
what these two terms have in common, that is a person with both heart and kidney.  
 Mind, Meaning and Miscommunication 
44 
Another term is needed to mark a distinction that clearly does exist. Since Putnam 
does not introduce another term to make this distinction in meaning, I will retain the term 
senseF for this purpose, leaving open for now the question of a precise philosophical 
explication of the term. I will return to this issue in a later chapter, but for the moment it is 
only necessary to emphasise that the existence of this dichotomy (whatever its precise 
nature) offers the potential for miscommunication. 
 
There is, however, another issue that Putnam fails to take into account in his 
analysis of meaning. This is, in fact, a third senseD of ‘meaning’ that needs to be 
distinguished, and that is “connotation”. The problem is illustrated by my example of the 
pastor working among the down-and-outs, and will be examined in the following section. 
6.4 Connotation 
 
In chapters 3 to 5 I have discussed three different methods by which we acquire 
terms and their meanings. In so doing, I have discussed the links that are formed from the 
representation of the term to whatever the term denotes. These links may be to perceptual 
representations, to conceptual representations, or to definitions that in their turn link to 
perceptual or conceptual representations (see figure 5.1). 
 
What is omitted in this analysis are the other links that can be created, and 
specifically the question of connotation, or tone. In addition to his division of the meaning 
of terms between senseF and referenceF, Frege also proposed two other aspects of meaning: 
force and tone. Force is the difference in an utterance that distinguishes between, for 
example, question and assertion. Tone (ie connotation) is illustrated by Case 5 above. 
 
 When a child acquires the term “father” a link is formed to the perceptual 
representation of their father. But as they have various experiences of their father, further 
links will be formed. If their father is a drunkard and a bully, then ‘father’ will become 
associated with these characteristics. In one sense, therefore, ‘father’ will come to mean 
drunkard and bully to them.  
 
The minister in our story had a very different experience, so that ‘father’ has the 
tone of love and support and encouragement. It should be noted that when he spoke to the 
young men in his care of God wanting to be a father to them, he was deliberately not using 
the term ‘Father’ in any theological sense, but trying to convey his own experience of 
fatherhood. 
 
In this situation the term ‘father’ had very different connotations for the two 
participants in the conversation. Miscommunication occurred because the minister failed to 
understand the bad connotation of ‘father’ for those to whom he was speaking. By his 
insistence that meaning is only to be located in the linguistic community, and not within the 
head, Putnam fails to make provision for this aspect of meaning. Mind, Meaning and Miscommunication 
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6.5 Conclusion 
 
In this chapter I brought to a conclusion my analysis of how we acquire the meaning 
of terms by looking firstly at the distinction between senseF and referenceF described by 
Frege. Putnam claimed that this distinction is wrong, that meaning must be restricted to the 
latter, and that therefore meaning is not to be found “in the head”. However, Putnam fails to 
account for the difference that he himself uses to illustrate the view that he seeks to 
disprove. There is, therefore, good reason to see ‘meaning’ as including both senseF and 
referenceF. 
 
In addition, I pointed to the factor of connotation, which involves us associating our 
experiences and emotions with a term in addition to its senseF and referenceF. It is not 
uncommon for someone to ask ‘what does x mean to you?’ in order to draw out this very 
aspect. It is necessary, therefore, to take account of all three aspects of meaning (senseF, 
referenceF and connotation) in explaining the meaning that each individual acquires as they 
acquire language. 
 
Differences in these three aspects of meaning between utterer and utteree have been 
seen from our examples to be a cause of miscommunication. They will be of particular 
concern when I turn to the way in which the utteree extracts meaning from an utterance, but 
before that the next three chapters will look at how we express meaning in our utterances. Mind, Meaning and Miscommunication 
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CHAPTER 7: LOST FOR WORDS 
Case 6 
  It was Sunday morning and as usual I was working on the general 
knowledge crossword in the Sunday paper. I came to a clue about New 
York, and I knew that I knew the word that was required. I could recall 
some of the features of the part of the New York indicated by the clue, but 
the name escaped me. Eventually I abandoned the crossword with that 
clue, and several others, uncompleted. Half an hour later, as my wife was 
reading the paper it suddenly came to me: the answer was “Harlem”. 
 
Case 7 
  The Reverend Spooner is famous for his verbal mishaps. On one 
occasion he accused a student of “hissing my mystery lecture” (instead of 
“missing my history lecture”). On another occasion he went into the 
dean’s office and asked his secretary “Is the bean dizzy?” (Larsen 2007) 
 
Case 8 
  In an episode of East Enders on BBC 1 Television one of the 
characters asks her friend “Do you shop orgasmically?” 
 
In this chapter I begin to examine the process by which we select words and put them 
together in order to form an utterance. Although the emphasis might be thought to be more 
psychological than philosophical, the points made will underpin the philosophical views on 
meaning in later chapters. I question why there are occasions when we are unable to find the 
word that we need to express our meaning, why we sometimes get our words confused, and 
what this indicates about our language faculty. 
7.1 Introduction 
 
Although the cases of miscommunication that have been considered so far have 
inevitably involved utterer, utterance and utteree, the focus has been on the process by 
which utterer and utteree acquire language. In this chapter the attention moves on to 
examine problems at the stage where the utterer attempts to express meaning by means of 
an utterance.  
 
It is clearly important when conveying meaning through an utterance both to select 
the correct terms and to combine them in the appropriate way, in order to express that 
meaning. By “correct term” I mean a term that conveys the meaning that you intend to 
convey. Miscommunication can occur when the utterer is unable to select a term to convey 
the intended meaning, or when the utterer selects an incorrect term. 
 
I discussed in Chapter 4 how it is possible to acquire a term with an incorrect 
meaning attached to it. There are, however, many other problems that can arise in the Mind, Meaning and Miscommunication 
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communication of meaning, and in the following section I will examine the implications of 
Case 6 above. 
7.2 Failure to retrieve 
 
Sometimes when working on a crossword I fail to solve a clue, and when I am able 
to check the answer I discover that it is a word that I have never learned. In the situation 
described in Case 6, however, I was aware that I knew the word – I was simply unable to 
retrieve it. I was not consciously thinking about the clue when my wife was reading the 
magazine that contained the crossword, yet the answer suddenly “popped into my head”. I 
am also conscious of the fact that if I had not been doing the crossword but had instead 
been reading an article in which I came across ‘Harlem’ I would have known its meaning 
immediately.  
 
These two facts indicate that there is a different process for retrieving terms from 
meanings to that which we use to retrieve meanings from terms.  This supports the view 
already discussed that the language faculty comprises separate parts for comprehension and 
language production (Carruthers 2006 pp 186ff). It is also borne out by sufferer’s of Broca’s 
aphasia who lose the ability to express themselves verbally although still able to understand 
what is said to them (http://www.sci.uidaho.edu/med532/Broca.htm accessed on 18
th June 
2007).  
 
Furthermore, my experience strongly suggests that the process of retrieving a term is 
a separate module within the language production section of the language faculty, and that 
under normal circumstances it is subconscious. Generally speaking I am not conscious of 
searching for each of the words that I use in an utterance: I simply utter them.  One of the 
criticisms of Grice’s approach to meaning (see section 4.3) stresses this very point. 
 
 
Th[e] structural complexity [of Grice’s approach] seems to be at odds with 
the ease with which we speak. If Grice is right, every time we open our 
mouths or pick up our pens to communicate, we form a complex triple-
parted intention. Is this plausible as a description of our psychology as 
speakers? Ordinary speakers would be hard pressed to give a verbal 
statement of the content of the intentions that Grice is saying they form at 
high speed in everyday conversation. (Barber 2005 p 30) 
 
 
It is true that when making a formal presentation at a seminar, or when drafting a 
thesis, I might pause and search for the appropriate term to convey my meaning, but this is 
the exception. I do not normally search for words to speak unless, in my own case, they are 
personal names of friends and colleagues that I frequently forget. 
 
I have suggested on the basis of my own experience as well as documented cases of 
aphasia that the process of selecting terms to express meaning is modular. This means that 
we are generally unaware of the process going on, and only become aware when it fails to Mind, Meaning and Miscommunication 
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produce the required output. In the following section I consider what can happen to the 
output when it has been successfully retrieved. 
7.3 Confusion and misconstruction 
 
The occurrence of malapropisms was highlighted by the character of Mrs Malaprop 
in Sheridan’s play The Rivals. They involve the selection of a word that sounds very like 
the word intended but that has a different meaning.  
 
A discussion of the exact place in the chain of language production where the error 
occurs, and the neurological structures that might account for its occurrence, are outside the 
scope of this thesis. It is possible that the fault lies in the module that retrieves terms to 
match given meanings (which has implications for how terms are stored within the brain). 
It is also possible that the problem arises when the speaker actually begins the process of 
speaking the term that has been correctly retrieved. 
 
It is true that confusion between ‘organic’, ‘organism’ and ‘orgasm’ can often create 
hilarity but, in common with many other malapropisms, it does not necessarily lead to 
miscommunication. I will return to this subject in a later chapter when I discuss how the 
utteree may recognise a malapropism and replace it with the supposed originally intended 
term. It remains the case, however, that this particular error results in a mismatch between 
the meaning intended by the utterer and the literal meaning of the utterance. 
 
After this brief look at malapropisms and their limited potential for 
miscommunication I turn now to the case of spoonerisms. Although in the case of 
malapropisms I was unable to choose between the term retrieval module and the language 
production module for the source of the error, in the case of spoonerisms the latter appears 
to be the culprit. It appears intuitively unlikely that Rev. Spooner retrieved the term ‘hissed’ 
for the meaning of ‘missed’ and ‘mystery’ for the meaning of ‘history’. But it does appear 
eminently possible that in the process of producing the sequence of sounds that form the 
terms ‘missed’ and ‘history’, the initial sounds of each group become transposed. This is 
borne out by the further error discussed in the following section. 
 
In this section I have briefly surveyed two types of error in the production of 
utterances, and have suggested that they lend support to the modular theory of language. 
Whilst in many situations these errors lead to merriment rather than serious 
miscommunication, their potential for the latter must not be overlooked. Before I conclude 
this chapter on the problems that can arise in selecting and using terms to express meaning, 
I will refer to one more example. 
7.4 Transposition 
 
I was listening to a news report some time ago about a new initiative that had been 
set up to assist the police. The reporter explained that its purpose was “to protect crime and 
prevent property”. Unlike the case of spoonerism where two letters were transposed (see 
above) in this case two terms have been transposed. There is an underlying similarity Mind, Meaning and Miscommunication 
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between the two terms ‘protect’ and ‘prevent’ and somehow in the process of language 
production the reporter has mixed them up. 
 
In this particular case the result was not serious, and I imagine that I was not alone 
in recognising the error and mentally correcting it. It is also possible that some listeners 
failed to spot the transposition but nevertheless correctly understood the reporter’s 
meaning.  
7.5 Conclusion 
 
In this chapter I looked at four situations in which an utterer fails to express his 
meaning correctly. The most serious case is when he or she is unable to retrieve the term 
that they need to express their meaning. In this situation it is usually only possible to use 
circumlocutions to express the intended meaning. It is also possible that the process for 
retrieving a term may go awry and return the wrong term: this is a possible explanation for 
malapropisms. 
 
Alternatively this particular form of word confusion may occur at the stage at which 
the mind performs the process of producing the sounds comprising the utterance. It is 
almost certainly at this stage that spoonerisms can occur, and also cases of word 
transposition. There is potential for miscommunication in all of these situations, although in 
practice the utteree may recognise what has happened and make appropriate adjustments to 
the utterance. I return to this issue in a later chapter. 
 
These errors in expressing meaning lend weight to the view previously mentioned 
that the language faculty comprises a number of distinct modules, perhaps organised (as 
previously mentioned) into three broad areas: comprehension, language production, and a 
common database. I discuss this further in the final chapter. 
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CHAPTER 8: UNINTENDED AMBIGUITY 
Case 9 
   Mrs Jones checked in her notebook before setting off for the 
primary school where she taught seven-year-olds. Today, she saw, her 
maths subject was weight. She quickly grabbed two carrier bags and 
placed various articles in them before rushing out of the door. Two hours 
later it was time for her maths lesson. Calling Tommy to the front of the 
class, she handed him one of the bags. “Now, Tommy,” she said, “can you 
tell me something in this room that it lighter than that bag?” He looked at 
the bag in his hand and then around the room. “That is, Miss!” he said 
with a big smile, pointing to her desk. Her desk was a large one with silver 
metal legs and a heavy top covered with a white veneer. Whereas the bag 
he was holding, which of course weighed far less, was dark blue. How was 
Tommy to know that she meant lighter in weight? 
 
Case 10 
  Amelie is a French student on an exchange visit to Scotland, staying 
with Mr and Mrs Smith. She says to Mrs Smith one evening, “I have cold”. 
“No. dear,” responds Mrs Smith, “you must say ‘I have a cold’. I will 
make you a hot lemon drink when it is time for bed.” “But I have a cold 
now,” says Amelie, and shivers theatrically. “Oh,” says Mrs Smith, “you 
mean you are cold!” 
 
Case 11 
  On other occasions, my wife would be relaxing in the living room. 
When she saw me enter the kitchen to get a snack, she would ask, “Would 
you like some tea?” Knowing that she knew that I did not drink tea, I 
found the question odd, but answered directly: “No, thank you.” I would 
complete my task and leave the kitchen. I could smell an emotional 
smouldering emanating from my wife, but could not figure out the cause. 
My wife indirectly had been asking me to get her some tea. 
(Martinich 2001 pp 25-26) 
 
In the previous chapter I considered how we sometimes fail to express our meaning 
by either failing to find the term we want, or by finding the wrong term. In this chapter I 
examine several instances of miscommunication that have unintended ambiguity as a 
common factor. I begin with the problem of terms that have multiple meanings, followed 
by what Quine terms “ambiguity of syntax” (Quine 1960 p 134). I then look at the problem 
caused by using the grammar of one language when speaking another language, before 
concluding this chapter with the confusion that can be caused by indirect speech acts. 
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8.1 A definition of ambiguity 
 
The word ‘ambiguous’ can be understood in two different senseDs. The electronic 
version of the Oxford Concise Dictionary (OCD) gives the first sense as “having more than 
one meaning”. If this is understood to mean having more than one senseD, then many 
English words are ambiguous, since many words have multiple meanings, one extreme 
example being ‘set’.  
  
The second senseD given by the OCD is “open to different interpretations” which is 
narrower than the first senseD, and is the senseD that I am using in this thesis. In other 
words, it is not simply the existence of multiple senseDs of a term that makes it ambiguous, 
but the possibility of confusion between those senseDs in a particular context. In the 
following section I will look at one such case of ambiguity. 
8.2 Ambiguity of terms 
 
The misunderstanding between Mrs Jones and Tommy (the names have been 
changed) actually did occur at the Infant School where my wife was the Mathematics Co-
ordinator.  The term ‘light’ can be applied to both weight and colour, and without any clue 
in the context (an issue I will return to in a later chapter) it should have been foreseen that 
the children could be confused. 
 
In the previous chapter I made the point that in the normal course of conversation 
we do not consciously think about every word before we use it: we simply talk. I did, 
however, suggest two exceptions in my own experience: “making a formal presentation at a 
seminar, or when drafting a thesis”. Choice of words is also clearly important in many other 
situations, such as teaching, writing a book, or giving evidence in court.  
 
Mrs Jones was guilty of inadequate preparation for her maths lesson. She should 
have recognised the ambiguity in the term ‘lighter’ and therefore either found an alternative 
term or, if that was not possible, provided clear evidence as to which senseD of the term she 
meant. If she had started her lesson by saying “Today we are going to be thinking about 
weight”, the chances of miscommunication would have been substantially reduced. 
 
This case clearly reveals the problem of ambiguity in the meaning of terms (see 
Quine 1960 p 129), but there is also the possibility of ambiguity of syntax. 
8.3 Ambiguity of syntax 
 
Quine (ibid p 134) illustrates this problem with a couplet by William Cowper: 
 
 
And Satan trembles when he sees 
The weakest saint upon his knees. 
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In this sentence it is not clear whether “his” refers back to “Satan” or to “the 
weakest saint”. In the first case Satan trembles (with pleasure?) when a saint is seated upon 
his (ie Satan’s) knees; in the second case Satan trembles (with fear?) when the weakest 
saint is on his (ie the saint’s) knees, that is when the saint is praying. It might be claimed 
that it is clearly the second case that was in Cowper’s mind when penning the words, but it 
is clear that ambiguities such as this can result in miscommunication. 
 
This case of ambiguity arises because of confusion about the antecedent of the 
pronoun “his”; ambiguity can also arise when the whole syntactic structure of an utterance 
has two possible interpretations.  An example of this will be found in the following chapter, 
where I examine cases of deliberate ambiguity. 
 
As with ambiguity of terms, it is the responsibility of the utterer to ensure, in cases 
of formal utterances, that their meaning is not obscured or completely lost to sight by 
ambiguity of syntax. Problems can also arise through wrong grammar, rather than through 
careless grammar. 
8.4 Linguistic confusion 
 
In a previous chapter I discussed the concept of “universal grammar” – which I 
equated with the innate ability that enables each of us to acquire both the syntax and the 
morphology of our communal language. It is claimed that within universal grammar there 
exist a number of parameters that are set for a particular language: one example is the order 
in which subject, verb and object appear (Cook and Newson 1996 pp 215ff). 
Miscommunication can arise when an utterer mistakenly applies the linguistic rules (the 
parameters) of one language to another, as shown by Case 10 at the start of this chapter. 
 
This particular case of miscommunication occurred because in French “je suis froid” 
(which translates into English as “I am cold”) means “I have a cold character” whereas “j’ai 
froid” (“I have cold”) means “I feel physically cold”. By applying French linguistic rules to 
an English utterance, the speaker failed to produce an utterance that the utteree could 
understand, even though both utterer and utteree had the same correct meaning of the 
individual words used. 
 
Ambiguity can also occur in both spoken and written English through ambiguity of 
phrasing. Reading a novel recently my wife struggled with a sentence that began with the 
words “Hoyt the sorcerer’s brother” which she read (using braces to show word groupings) 
as being about Hoyt, who was the {brother of the sorcerer}. In fact, the sentence was about 
the brother of {Hoyt the sorcerer}.  
 
Punctuation can be used to avoid this type of confusion. The first – incorrect – 
meaning of the words quoted above could have been written as “Hoyt, the sorcerer’s 
brother,”; it might be argued that the absence of commas clearly marked the second 
meaning. However, punctuation is notoriously unreliable, to the extent that English law 
requires that punctuation be ignored when interpreting legal documents. 
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In this section I have shown how ambiguity can arise from the misuse of linguistic 
rules, whether from a failure of knowledge or sheer carelessness. Whether it is poor syntax 
or poor punctuation, ambiguity runs the risk of miscommunication. In the following section 
I consider a particular type of ambiguity which is caused neither by lack of knowledge nor 
by carelessness. 
8.5 Indirect speech acts 
 
In this section I turn to another, not uncommon, cause of ambiguity. This is the use 
of what have been termed “indirect speech acts”, that is when an utterance in the form of 
one type of speech act is used to convey a different speech act. A simple case would be the 
utterance “Can you pass the salt?” by your dinner companion. This is in the form of a 
question but will probably, in fact, be a request. 
 
The story that Martinich tells against himself (Case 11) vividly illustrates the 
communicative problems that can arise in the case of indirect speech acts.  Martinich 
recognised that his wife’s utterance was in the form of a question and responded 
accordingly. His wife intended it to be a request, and when he failed to fulfil it, she 
responded accordingly. There are, linguists tell us, differences in the speech patterns of men 
and women in all speech communities (Holmes, 2001, p 150). When a wife says to her 
husband “Do you feel the draught from that window, dear?” she may not be expecting an 
answer of either “yes” or “no”. She may not really be interested in whether her husband can 
feel the draught. The intended meaning might be – and woe betide the husband who fails to 
recognise it, if it is – “please shut that window; I’m getting a draught from it”. 
 
Lest I be accused of blaming women for causing the problem, let me give another 
example. A man’s wife comes downstairs having got ready for a night out at the theatre with 
her husband. “You are an ugly old bird, aren’t you?”, are the words he greets her with. He 
would be mortally offended if she took him to mean literally what the utterance means: in 
his rather crass way he is clearly paying her a compliment! 
 
I will return to this issue in a later chapter when I consider how the utteree can 
extract the meaning intended by the utterer as opposed to the actual meaning of the words 
used by the utterer. For the moment it is sufficient to note that the use of indirect speech acts 
by the utterer poses a risk of miscommunication: a risk that can trip up even philosophers of 
language! 
8.6 Conclusion 
 
In this chapter I looked at the ways in which various forms of ambiguity and poor 
grammar can bring about failure in the expression of meaning. In situations where the 
conveyance of meaning is important, such as teaching or writing for publication, the utterer 
has a responsibility (a) to avoid ambiguous terms, or to provide additional information 
(either linguistic or non-linguistic) that will obviate any ambiguity, and (b) to order the 
terms selected with the correct syntax. In the final chapter of this section on the expression 
of meaning, I examine instances of deliberate ambiguity. Mind, Meaning and Miscommunication 
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CHAPTER 9: DELIBERATE AMBIGUITY 
Case 12 
  A television sketch show some years ago included a fake 
advertisement. “Nothing acts faster than Anadin,” it began (quoting a then 
popular advert). “So take Nothing” it ended, to fanfare of trumpets. 
 
Case 13 
  Extract from promotional literature received by post (with personal 
names omitted). 
 
On receipt of your Personal Validation Sheet within the regulatory deadline and if it conforms in all points to the Report of the 
Independent Supervisor 
 
Mrs ***** It’s official, the sum of £11,500.00 will mandatorily be sent to 
you by BANK CHEQUE in your name by recorded delivery registered 
mail. CONFIRMED. 
 
Mrs ***** you are the sole addressee of this dossier in your name. 
Your unique draw no. is: 3022153130 
 
The sum to be awarded to our winner, Mrs *****, is indeed £11,500.00 
paid in a single instalment. 
 
In the previous chapter I considered various examples of ambiguity and how these 
might cause miscommunication. The common factor in these cases is accidence: the 
utterers were either careless, had insufficient command of the language, or used an indirect 
speech act in an unclear way. In this chapter by contrast I look at examples of deliberate 
ambiguity. 
 
After an introductory survey of how cases of deliberate ambiguity fit into the 
philosophical views on meaning discussed previously, I comment briefly on the type of 
deliberate ambiguity commonly called “double entendre”. Following this I review the use 
of ambiguity in advertising, before ending with ambiguity in fraud. 
9.1 Introduction 
 
Grice put forward the view that meaning is to be located in the intentions of the 
utterer. He did acknowledge that utterances could be ambiguous, and gave as an example 
the sentence “He is in the grip of a vice”. He pointed out that the utteree could not tell, from 
these words alone, whether the person concerned is being physically restrained by a 
gripping tool or being mentally bound by a bad habit (Grice 2001b p 167). From this and 
similar cases, Grice points to the need for other clues in the context in order to determine 
which of these two possible meanings is, in fact, the meaning that was intended.  
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I will return to this issue in more detail when I discuss the extraction of meaning. 
What is important to note at this point is that Grice sees the ambiguity as a problem with 
the utterance, not with the intention. In his attack on Grice’s position, Putnam claimed that 
meaning is not to be located in the head of the utterer but in the outside world (see 4.4.1 
above). He concedes that there may be ambiguity in the mind, as in the case of his inability 
to distinguish between beech and elm trees, but claims, in effect, that there is no ambiguity 
of referenceF. Society defers to experts to determine the precise meaning of terms such as 
‘beech’ and ‘elm’. 
 
When Searle discusses indirect speech acts he makes clear that there is a problem of 
ambiguity. He begins his article on the subject with what is, in effect, a restatement of 
Grice’s position, but he goes on to show that things are not as simple as Grice envisages. 
 
 
The simplest cases of meaning are those in which the speaker utters a 
sentence and means exactly and literally what he says. In such cases the 
speaker intends to produce a certain illocutionary effect in the hearer [ie 
wants the hearer to respond to his utterance in a particular way], and he 
intends to produce this effect by getting the hearer to recognise this 
intention to produce it, and he intends to get the hearer to recognise this 
intention in virtue of the hearer’s knowledge of the rules that govern the 
utterance of the sentence. But notoriously, not all cases of meaning are this 
simple: In hints, insinuations, irony and metaphor – to mention a few 
examples – the speaker’s utterance meaning and the sentence meaning 
coming apart in various ways. (Searle 2001 p 176) 
 
 
However, Searle does not simply differentiate two types of meaning: the utterer’s 
meaning and the utterance meaning. He goes on to suggest that in cases such as indirect 
speech acts there are two distinct utterer’s meanings. He speaks of “the problem of how it is 
possible for the speaker to say one thing and mean that but also to mean something else” 
(ibid p 177).  It is debatable whether in such cases the utterer intends the utteree to 
understand the literal meaning as the intended meaning; it is equally possible to view the 
literal meaning as a step in the process of discovering the intended meaning.  
 
If my dinner companion asks “Can you reach the salt?” does she really intend me to 
understand that as a question about the extent of my reach? That seems doubtful: the 
intended meaning is “pass me the salt, please”. By contrast, however, the examples of 
miscommunication that I will discuss in this chapter lead me to the view that on some 
occasions there are two distinct meanings in the intentions of the utterer, and two distinct 
meanings in the utterance itself. I will look very briefly at one widespread example of this 
phenomenon, before looking in more depth at two more serious scenarios. 
9.2 The Double Entendre 
 
This particular linguistic form has been made famous by saucy seaside postcards 
and films such as the “Carry On” series. Imagine a postcard showing a large lady with her Mind, Meaning and Miscommunication 
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undergarments clearly visible and two flowers in her hand. “What a fine pair of bloomers!” 
says the text below the picture. In these, and less saucy forms of pun, the utteree is intended 
to recognise both possible meanings of the utterance. It is the realisation that there is both 
an innocent and a saucy reading of the utterance that creates the humour. 
 
Most double entendres, like the one above, depend upon semantic ambiguity 
(discussed in the previous chapter). It is also possible to create a form of double entendre 
by deliberate use of syntactic ambiguity.  Driving home from university one day, I found 
myself behind a security company vehicle displaying the slogan “We have a reputation to 
protect”. This is clearly intended to be understood in two distinct ways: “we have a 
reputation for providing protection” and “we have a (good) reputation that we will protect 
by continuing good service”. The ambiguity is intended. 
 
The use of double entendres is one case of there being two meanings, both in the 
intentions of the utterer and in the utterance itself. Whilst such cases of deliberate 
ambiguity may, of themselves, be sufficient to challenge the traditional philosophical views 
about meaning, it is the use of double meanings in other situations which is more serious, 
and perhaps of more philosophical and psychological significance. 
9.3 Advertising speak 
 
If the case quote above from the sketch show is an example of miscommunication, 
then that miscommunication turns on the issue of quantification and the misuse of the term 
“nothing”. That is not the issue, however, that I plan to discuss. Of more significance for 
this study is the form of the advertisement being parodied. 
 
There are countless advertisements to be seen or heard that are similar in their 
structure to “Nothing acts faster than Anadin”. I suggest that the reason for this style of 
advertising is that the advertisement is aimed at two different audiences and is therefore 
designed to express two different meanings. 
 
Advertisements are required to obey the law and to comply with the standards set by 
the Advertising Standards Authority (ASA). That Authority and the law courts are one of 
the audiences being addressed. Any claims made about a product must be legal and 
justifiable. A claim that Anadin is the fastest acting painkiller would have to be legally 
defensible for it to pass the scrutiny of the ASA. When there are many similar drugs on the 
market that might be difficult, if not impossible, to prove. But the wording adopted is open 
to the meaning that Anadin is one of many drugs that act with a similar speed. 
 
However, the purpose of advertising is not, in essence, to satisfy the ASA – it is to 
promote and sell a product. If no-one is ahead of you in a race, then you are leading (even if 
you are sharing the lead). The man in the street – the other audience for whom the 
advertiser is writing – might overlook the fact that the lead can be shared and think that if 
no other drug is faster than Anadin, then Anadin must be the fastest. This reasoning is, of 
course, faulty but widespread and allows the advertiser to suggest to its main audience that 
it is the best, whilst at the same time being able to prove legally that it has not actually 
made that claim. Mind, Meaning and Miscommunication 
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This is not the place to discuss the morality of utterances such as this that are open 
to two distinct interpretations, and where both interpretations are intended. It might be 
argued that there is only one meaning, ie the correct understanding of the words used, and 
that the words do not actually mean that the product is the best. But my point is that it is 
this false meaning that the writer intends to be understood.  If in any sense meaning is 
intentional (in Grice’s sense) then this meaning, albeit logically fallacious, is an intended 
meaning. 
 
There is also scope for a debate as to whether such cases should be classed as 
miscommunications. It is enough to note that this is a widespread practice, and that any 
theory of meaning must be able to cope with them. In the following section I examine an 
example of double meaning that has more serious implications – for the utteree if not for 
the philosopher. 
9.4 The scam 
 
In this section I discuss a third type of communication in which there exist two 
distinct intentions in the mind of the utterer, and as a result two distinct meanings in the 
utterance. It is not my purpose to consider the ethical issues raised by this style of writing, 
but it would, I think, be widely held to be of very questionable morality. 
 
The documentation, of which extracts are set out as Case 13 at the beginning of this 
chapter, was sent out by a company soliciting for orders from their catalogue.  I have 
selected a few extracts for discussion but they are typical of the rest of this, and of many 
other similar, documents. 
 
The first point to make is that although I have shown some words in small print, I 
have not enlarged the words that follow, located between the two red lines. These are a 
larger point size on the original document and their position between two red lines marks 
them out to be read as an utterance in their own right. In fact the words in small print and 
the words in large print form a single sentence, so that the promise “will mandatorily be 
sent to you” is conditional on receipt of the “Personal Validation Sheet” and conformity “in 
all points to the Report of the Supervisor”. 
 
The statement that Mrs ***** is the sole addressee of the dossier means little; a 
quick glance at the address panel confirms that. The reference to a unique draw number 
(omitting the name of the addressee, which when it appears is always in capital letters) 
might divert thought away from the idea that you are the winner. But this possibility is 
immediately offset by the following statement: “The sum to be awarded to our winner,  
Mrs *****, is indeed £11,500.00”. 
 
This is the most blatant case of two meanings being intended. The first intended 
meaning, to be understood by the person receiving the documentation, is that Mrs ***** is 
the winner. The sentence is intended to be read by the recipient in the same way as a 
sentence such as “the person opening the fete is the Prime Minister, Mr Brown”. But, of 
course, Mrs ***** is only the winner if she has the unique number already drawn and if she 
complies with all the complex requirements for responding. Mind, Meaning and Miscommunication 
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However, if challenged about this apparent lie, the author of the document will 
point out that it was intended to be read in the same way as “the reason we wrote to you, 
Mrs *****, is that you purchased something from our sister company”. The ambiguity in 
this particular utterance is not accidental; it is a deliberate attempt to persuade the utteree to 
extract a particular – albeit false – meaning whilst at the same time expressing an 
alternative – legally acceptable – meaning. 
9.5 Conclusion 
In this chapter I looked at cases, ranging from the light-hearted to the very serious, 
in which there are two distinct meanings intended by the utterer and therefore two distinct 
meanings in the utterance. I will return to the issue of the meaning of ‘meaning’ in the final 
part of the thesis, but before that I turn in the next part to the question of how we extract 
meaning from utterances. Mind, Meaning and Miscommunication 
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CHAPTER 10: PAYING ATTENTION 
 
Case 14 
  In a television advertisement a young couple are seated in a fast 
food restaurant. The young man is holding a hamburger with all the 
trimmings in both hands, and is regarding it closely. The young woman is 
speaking, telling him that she realises that it will not be easy, but she 
really wants to go to college and get her qualification. She stops speaking 
and it is several seconds before he realises that she was speaking to him. 
He drags his gaze away from the hamburger, and ventures a response. 
“Terracotta?” he says. 
 
 Case 15 
  My wife and I were sitting across from each other, both engrossed in 
our shared hobby of cross-stitch embroidery. Suddenly I realised she was 
speaking and caught the words “finished the backstitching”. I thought she 
was asking me whether I had finished the backstitching, so I said “No”. 
“What do you mean ‘no’?” she said. “I said ‘That’s me finished the 
backstitching’. What did you think I said?” 
 
Case 16 
  Jimmy was on a school trip to Germany. One evening he saw a 
good-looking girl coming down the hostel stairs and decided to chat her 
up. He was disappointed that he could not make head or tail of her 
responses. Then suddenly he realised that he was speaking to her in 
German, but she was speaking to him in English – albeit in a broad 
Geordie accent.  
 
In Part Two I looked at the acquisition of meaning as part of the process of language 
learning, and in Part Three I discussed the expression of meaning in utterances. On several 
occasions I made reference, albeit in passing, to the role of the utteree. In this part of the 
thesis it is that role that comes to the fore, as I look at how we extract meaning from 
utterances. 
 
I begin the process in this chapter by examining the very basic issues: recognising 
that there is an utterance, paying attention to the utterance, and extracting the words 
forming the utterance. All of these processes must occur before we can begin to extract 
meaning. 
10.1 Recognising an utterance 
 
In section 3.4 I listed some of the skills that make up the innate language ability 
demonstrated by even the youngest children. I pointed out that children only four or five 
days old respond positively to the sound of their communal language, distinguishing it from 
other languages. But underlying this ability is the ability to identify language itself. 
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Neurologists have identified several specific areas of the brain that are used for 
language processing. But for those areas that process incoming speech to function, there 
must be a mechanism that detects that the sounds being heard are speech and directs the 
input to the language processing area. This mechanism is subconscious: I do not have to 
spend all my time consciously analysing the sounds picked up by my ears in order to 
determine whether they constitute speech. I simply recognise speech, whether in my own 
language or another. 
 
Furthermore, I also commented in section 3.4 on the innate ability to distinguish the 
distinct sounds that form the phonetic structure of one’s communal language, which is also 
subconscious. This means that when a stream of sounds has been identified as language, it 
is then broken down into its component sounds (phonemes), the stream of phonemes is 
segmented into words, and the syntax identified. These innate abilities are honed during 
childhood and the last-named fails to develop if the child is not exposed to language before 
puberty (see the case of Genie Wiley discussed in section 3.4). 
 
It is possible to acquire fluency in a language that is learned after puberty, but the 
skill involved has to be learned in the same way that we learn a physical skill such as golf 
or playing the piano. With constant practice such skills can become unconscious and work 
best when they are unconscious. A concert pianist cannot consciously think about which 
finger to place in which position for every note to be played. The same is true for the skill 
of understanding language. 
 
In most cases, therefore, when an utterance is made in the presence of an uttereee, 
the utteree will detect the occurrence of the utterance, and by a chain of processes will 
extract a sequence of meaningful units (words).  This chain is illustrated in Figure 10.1. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 10.1 – Processing speech 
 
As shown in the diagram, these processes will occur automatically, generally 
without the conscious action of the utteree. The question to be considered, therefore, in the 
rest of this chapter is how this process can go wrong, even before the stage of extracting 
meaning. (I return to the issue of the precise form of the representation of the utterance in a 
later chapter.) 
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10.2. Attention 
 
I have claimed both in chapter 3 and in the previous section that the processes 
involved in recognising and handling an utterance are either subconscious or unconscious. 
The distinction between the two types of process is as follows. Subconscious processes 
were acquired without the involvement of consciousness (for example, the child’s ability to 
distinguish the specific speech sounds of his or her native language) and take place without 
the possibility of conscious awareness. Unconscious processes are acquired consciously 
(like many manual skills such as sport) but when acquired work best, and under normal 
circumstances, without the involvement of consciousness. It remains possible, however, to 
perform such processes consciously, but at the cost of loss of speed. 
 
There is ample evidence that thought processes can operate without us being aware 
of them. I am not alone, I am sure, in having on occasion realised that I have driven several 
miles – coping with traffic and road conditions – whilst my conscious mind has been taken 
up with a problem to do with work or family. There is no reason, therefore, that the 
processes involved in detecting and analysing an utterance cannot take place without my 
being aware of it if my mind is focussed on something else. 
 
This is the situation demonstrated by Case 14. The miscommunication occurred 
because the man’s awareness was focussed on the hamburger and he failed therefore to be 
aware that he was being addressed. In the following case, the utteree became aware of the 
utterance after it had begun. The result was that the utteree had only a partial utterance 
available from which to extract meaning. Again there was miscommunication, but this was 
not caused solely by the inattention, but also by the wrong assignment of meaning that 
resulted. I will return to this issue in the next chapter. 
 
In this section I showed how inattention can result in failure to retrieve all or part of 
an utterance, even though the processes that create the representation of the utterance out of 
the stream of sounds work perfectly. In the final section of this chapter, I examine a case 
where these processes themselves fail. 
10.3 Making assumptions 
 
In this section I consider what assumptions underlie the operation of the processes 
that extract the utterance from the stream of sounds that the utterer forms in order to 
express it. I suggest that the existence of these assumptions explain the problem 
encountered by the English schoolboy on a trip to Germany (Case 16). 
 
I discussed in section 3.4 the fact the even the youngest children can distinguish 
between their communal language and other languages. This clearly presupposes the 
existence of the first process outlined above, by which speech is differentiated from other 
sounds. I also discussed in that section the fact that children learn at a very early stage to 
differentiate the specific sounds (phonemes) of their communal language. Apart from 
interference (such as noise) there is little reason to expect problems with this process. 
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However, when a second (or subsequent) language is learned after puberty, the 
sounds of that language have to be consciously acquired. It is probable that some sounds 
will be common to both the communal and the learned language, but the proportion of 
common sounds will very widely depending on the languages involved. It appears not 
unreasonable to assume that the consciously acquired process that differentiates the sounds 
of a foreign language may be triggered, on at least some occasions, by the fact that we 
expect to hear that language. 
 
Since the schoolboy in Case 16 was in Germany, he was expecting to hear German 
being spoken. When faced with the stream of sounds from the girl to whom he was talking, 
it seems likely that it was the learned German-sound-differentiating process that was in 
play rather than his innate English-sound-differentiating process. Had the girl spoken in his 
own regional dialect (which was broadly what is now known as “Estuary English”) he 
might very quickly have realised that he was employing the wrong module, and correctly 
extracted what she was saying. 
 
Since the girl was from the North East and spoke with a Geordie accent, the system 
of sounds forming her dialect of English was very different from his own. If the sound 
differentiating module was producing a stream of sounds based on the assumption that the 
language was German, it is clear that the subsequent process (that breaks the stream of 
sounds into meaningful pieces, ie words) would fail.  
 
It appears inevitable that there are separate sound- and word-differentiating modules 
for each language that an individual speaks. When faced with someone speaking when we 
do not know in advance what language to expect, it seems likely that we try different 
modules in turn until we either successfully extract an utterance or exhaust the supply of 
modules.  
 
What I draw from this particular case is (a) that we have a choice of modules that 
extract the utterance from the stream of sounds that form it, (b) that the choice of modules 
to be used may be subconsciously selected by our expectations, and (c) that when faced 
with a language that we were not expecting, we go through an iterative process of trying 
each differentiating process in turn until we either find a match or run out of options.  
 
Only when this whole series of process is complete are we in a position to begin to 
extract meaning from the utterance. How we do that is the subject of the next two chapters. 
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CHAPTER 11: THE IMPORTANCE OF CONTEXT 
Case 17 
  My aunt was 95 years old and very deaf and almost blind, although 
her mind was still as active as ever. On one of my weekly visits I was 
telling her about the heavy snow that had fallen and commented that the 
road from Largs to Kilbirnie was closed. She had no difficulty picking up 
‘Kilbirnie’ but was stumped by ‘Largs’. After several abortive attempts to 
repeat the word I said “It is a very steep hill”. “Oh, she said, “Largs!” 
 
In the previous chapter I discussed the several processes that take place before we 
are in a position to extract the meaning from an utterance. In this chapter I look at several 
closely related factors that play a role in enabling us to extract meaning. I begin with some 
evidence that appears, on the surface, to run contrary to the case of inattention in the 
previous chapter. I then consider the problem of ambiguity, before discussing how we 
select between alternative meanings of terms with multiple meanings. In conclusion, I 
review the type of contextual clue that Grice calls ‘implicature’.  
11.1 Subconscious attention 
 
I begin by considering the implications of an experiment carried out in the 1970s to 
elucidate the resolution of ambiguity. This has implications for our understanding both of 
attention, and of the process of extracting meaning.  
 
The case of the young couple in the fast food restaurant, which I discussed in the 
previous chapter, demonstrates clearly that, when our attention is focussed on something 
else, we can fail entirely to realise that an utterance has occurred. On other occasions we 
may become aware that someone is speaking to us after they have begun, and thus miss part 
of the utterance. But there is evidence that on some occasions we hear and understand an 
utterance without being aware that we have done so. 
 
In an article published in 1972 Lackner and Garrett discuss experiments that they 
had performed to investigate how we resolve ambiguity. Their method was to connect 
separate sound sources to each ear of the participants. Into one ear they played a sentence 
that was ambiguous such as “The spy put out the torch as our signal to attack”. Into the 
other ear they provided information that could clarify the ambiguity, but at such a low 
volume that many participants did not even report hearing it.  Some participants were 
played “The spy extinguished the torch in the window” and others were played “The spy 
showed the torch from the window”. 
 
The results of their experiment showed that when asked to paraphrase the original 
sentence on the attended channel, the participants were influenced by the information 
provided on the unattended channel. This was true even when the participant was not aware 
that anything had been played on that channel. 
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The difference between the previously discussed cases of inattention and this 
experimental result is that in the former case the individuals had their attention focussed on 
something other than the utterance. In the latter case the participants were paying attention 
to an utterance, but were not consciously aware that they were also hearing a second 
parallel utterance. Despite this unawareness, the participants drew on the meaning of the 
secondary utterance in extracting the meaning of the main utterance, and thus resolving the 
deliberate ambiguity included therein. 
 
I return to this issue in a later chapter when I focus on the modularity of the process 
of extracting meaning. At this point it is only necessary to note that the participants used 
the knowledge gained – subconsciously – from another source in order to extract the 
meaning from an utterance. In the following sections I look at other examples of this 
process. 
11.2 Additional information 
 
In the introduction to chapter 9 I quoted an utterance used by Grice to illustrate 
ambiguity – “He is in the grip of a vice”. Grice points out that the utteree could not tell, 
from these words alone, whether the person spoken about is being physically restrained by 
a gripping tool or being mentally bound by a bad habit (Grice 2001b p 167). Unless the 
utterance is made in the physical presence of the subject of the sentence, the utteree has no 
clues from the context to resolve the ambiguity. The situation is therefore similar to that 
where due to deafness or other impediment, some of the utterance was missed, in that there 
are also no clues available in the latter case to enable the meaning to be extracted. 
 
Because of her deafness, my aunt had imperfectly grasped the sounds that I made to 
indicate the town of Largs, and was unable to match the sound pattern to a known term. 
However, as soon as she was given a clue (there is a very steep hill into Largs coming from 
Glasgow) she was able to make the match. 
 
This is very similar to my experience (and I have no doubt that of many other 
crossword fans) when doing a crossword. I come to a clue, and I cannot solve it. I therefore 
move on to other clue whose answers include letters of the original unsolved answer. When 
I solve one of the latter clues, and gain a letter to help solve the unsolved clue, the answer 
becomes immediately obvious. I am not here considering those cases where I work my way 
through the alphabet trying to form the answer. 
 
Since one case concerns the sounds of words and the other the spelling of words, it 
is probable that there are two different processes involved. The common feature is that 
external clues have an impact on the search for a word.  
11.3 The clue is in the words 
 
At the start of this chapter I quoted experimental data showing that we can use data 
acquired subconsciously from one utterance to understand another utterance. I turn now to 
consider how we use clues from within an utterance to help extract the meaning. I am not Mind, Meaning and Miscommunication 
67 
concerned so much with ambiguity as with the fact that many terms have multiple 
meanings, from which we need to select the appropriate one on each occasion. 
 
Consider the following utterance: 
 
I watched Henman’s last set while I was waiting for the jelly to set. 
 
In this short utterance there are two separate tokens of the word ‘set’, which has a 
multiplicity of meanings. Collins English Dictionary has 49 sub-entries for ‘set’ as a verb, 
plus 9 for ‘set’ as a noun and 16 separate entries for phrases beginning with ‘set’. In order 
for the utteree to understand the utterance they must extract the correct meaning of ‘set’ 
each time it occurs. 
 
In the case of the first occurrence there is a clue in the nearby word ‘Henman’. This 
name denotes a well-known British tennis player, and the game of tennis is divided into 
sets. For the second occurrence the clue is provided by the word ‘jelly’. This is formed by 
mixing gelatine with boiling water and then waiting for the resulting mixture to set as it 
cools down.  
 
In this instance the clues to extracting the meaning of some terms within the 
utterance are found within the meaning of other terms therein. More commonly, clues to the 
meaning of an utterance are to be found within the wider context, using the process which 
Grice calls ‘conversational implicature’. 
11.4 Implicature 
 
In his article Logic and Conversation, Grice introduces the concept of implicature 
and then outlines several aspects of conversational implicature (Grice 2001b pp 169ff). In 
the following paragraphs I summarise some of the main points that he makes, and the 
examples that he gives. I also expand the analysis to include the problem of indirect speech 
acts. 
11.4.1 Relevance 
 
We are entitled to assume that an utterance has relevance. Take the following 
conversation. 
 
A  I am out of petrol 
B  There is a garage round the corner 
 
The utterance by B would only be relevant if the garage referred to sold petrol. The 
utterer can therefore extract the meaning ‘There is a garage where you can buy petrol round 
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11.4.2 Quantity of Information 
 
We are entitled to assume that an utterance provides sufficient information to fulfil 
its intended purpose. Take the following conversation. 
 
A.  I’m going to France for my holiday. Where does C live? 
B.  Somewhere in the South. 
 
It is clear that A is asking for an address for C. He is therefore entitled to assume 
that B does not know it. The meaning he can therefore extract is ‘I do not know his exact 
address, but it is somewhere in the south of France’ 
 
The other side of the coin would be the inclusion of too much information. If the 
boss asks A, one of his employees, “where is B today” and.A gives a long and complicated 
answer the boss may take the view once expressed as “Methinks the lady doth protest too 
much”. The meaning therefore he might draw from the answer “he claims that B is . . . but I 
believe that that is a lie”. 
11.4.3 Perspicuity 
 
We are entitled to assume that an utterance is meant to be as clear in meaning as 
possible. An obvious lack of clarity conveys meaning. One example, based on Grice, is 
when A and B are holding a conversation in the presence of C. A asks a simple question, 
but B’s answer is not as clear as would be expected. A can extract as part of the meaning of 
B’s utterance that he does not wish C to know the answer that he assumes A is capable of 
extracting. This scenario is perhaps most common when adults do not wish children to 
understand their conversation. 
11.4.4 Implicature in written material 
 
Very similar principles to those for conversation can be assumed to apply in the 
case of writing. For example, a reference should say something about the work abilities of 
the person concerned. A reference that said 
 
To whom it may concern 
A is well-liked by her colleagues, has an excellent attendance record and is 
always very punctual. 
 
would clearly carry the implication that she is not very good at work-related activities. 
 
11.5 Conclusion 
 
In this chapter I looked at various clues that enable us to extract meaning from an 
utterance. In some cases those clues may be provided by the utterer in the form of 
additional utterances, as when I sought to help my aunt understand my utterance about Mind, Meaning and Miscommunication 
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Largs. It has also been shown that, in an experimental situation, we may obtain a clue to 
understanding an utterance from another utterance of which we were not even aware. 
 
In many cases the clues are to be found within the utterance itself. In some cases 
these are direct linguistic clues, in others they are implications. In the latter situation, we 
draw on certain expectations about utterances – such as relevance and clarity – in order to 
extract their full meaning. These expectations apply both the spoken and written utterances, 
but are perhaps more commonly applied in conversation.  
 
In the next chapter I examine situations in which we are led to reject the obvious 
meaning of an utterance and substitute another. The clues that lead us to do so may be in 
the utterance itself, in the context in which the utterance occurs, or in our own assessment 
of utterer’s intentions. Mind, Meaning and Miscommunication 
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CHAPTER 12: HIDDEN MEANINGS 
Case 18 
  I was watching a television program entitled “Test The Nation” in 
which the studio audience and viewers at home were asked to answer a 
series of questions. In one particular question we were asked to count a 
number of occurrences of some feature. When it came time to mark our 
answers, the compere told us “If you found 1 to 3, award yourself 1 point; 
if you found 4 to 6, award yourself 2 points; for more than 7 it is 3 points.” 
I realised immediately that he had made no provision for exactly 7 items 
found. I assumed that this was unintentional, and that the meaning 
intended was that 3 points should be awarded for 7 or more items found. 
 
In my discussion on the expression of meaning in chapter 9, I drew attention to 
various circumstances in which an utterance might have more than one meaning from the 
point of view of the utterer. In this chapter I turn to the opposite side of the coin, and 
consider how the utteree can decide which of several possible meanings is the one actually 
intended. 
 
I begin with a discussion of the concept of literal meaning, before considering 
reasons why there are occasions on which this meaning should be rejected.  In doing so I 
refer back to several cases first discussed in previous chapters. 
12.1 Literal meaning 
 
Linguists and philosophers of language frequently refer to the “literal meaning” of a 
sentence or an utterance. This can be defined as the meaning that a competent member of 
the speech community would extract from the sentence/utterance in the absence of external 
clues. It is the meaning that a non-native speaker with a sound knowledge of the grammar 
of the language would extract with the help of a good dictionary. 
 
The importance of this version of meaning as the starting point to understanding the 
utterer’s intention is emphasised by Mark Platts. 
 
 
Utterers' intentions are not recognised by unfailing intuition, nor do Acts of 
God figure large. It is perhaps possible that that very simple intentions be 
detected quasi-behaviouristically; but for intentions of any fair degree of 
complexity, this is simply implausible, the behavioural guide being too 
inexact. Any explanation of how such intentions are recognised will inevitably 
rely upon the audience's recognition of the literal meaning of the sentence; 
that meaning is the route to the speaker's intentions, the reverse journey 
usually being impossible. (Platts 1979 p 91) 
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My purpose throughout the remainder of this chapter is to uncover why and how an 
utteree comes to reject the literal meaning and substitute another. 
12.2 Words out of place 
 
In chapter 7 I discussed a number of ways in which an utterer may make a mistake 
in expressing their meaning. These included well-known foibles such as spoonerisms and 
malapropisms, and errors such as the transposition of similar sounding words. How does 
the utteree extract the intended meaning in such cases? There appear to be three steps in the 
process. 
Step One 
The utteree recognises that the utterance has no meaning as it stands or that the 
literal meaning is clearly not the intended meaning. The route to this recognition may 
involve one of the following: 
 
  Identifying the use of a non-existent term, as in “the sip is shinking”; 
  Recognising that the utterance makes no sense as it stands even though all the 
individual terms are meaningful, as in “the Soil Association supports orgasmic 
farming”. 
Step Two 
The utteree looks for words that have some similarity with those identified in Step 
One and which would form a meaningful utterance if replacing them. 
 
Step Three 
The utteree replaces the suspect terms with possible alternatives until a meaning 
emerges that is coherent and relevant to the circumstances of the utterance. 
 
This process can be illustrated by one of the spoonerisms in Case 7. The dean’s 
secretary is in her office when Dr Spooner comes in and asks “Is the bean dizzy?” It is 
clearly foolish to speak of beans being dizzy and there is no reason why Dr Spooner should 
ask her about beans. She recognises that ‘bean’ sounds very like ‘dean’ and that ‘dizzy’ 
sounds very like ‘busy’. Since she knows Dr Spooner of old, she also knows of his 
tendency to transpose the initial sounds of words. She therefore extracts the meaning “Is the 
dean busy?” which makes perfect sense in the context. 
 
Introspection suggests that I followed a very similar process when I recognised the 
transposition inadvertently made by a television news reporter (see chapter 7). I realised 
that “protecting crime and preventing property” did not make sense, but “preventing crime 
and protecting property” did. I therefore extracted the latter as the intentional meaning. 
 
In this section I considered how we can make sense of utterances that clearly do not 
make sense (either because they are meaningless or because we reject the literal meaning as 
unintended). I suggested a three-stage process by which we extract the intended meaning Mind, Meaning and Miscommunication 
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from such utterances. In the following section I turn to a more difficult category: indirect 
speech acts. 
12.3 Indirect Speech Acts 
 
In Section 8.4 I discussed indirect speech acts from the perspective of the utterer. In 
this section the focus turns to the utteree. How is the utteree to recognise an indirect speech 
act and thereby extract the intended meaning rather than the literal meaning? 
 
Frege introduced the concept of ‘force’ which is that aspect of a sentence that marks 
the difference between assertion, question, command and wish and the like (see Miller 
1998 pp 55-59). Indirect speech acts are those where the force of the utterance differs from 
the intention, as in the example I quoted previously. “Can you reach the salt?” has the force 
of a question, but is more commonly meant as a request.  
 
On occasion a sentence may be formed in which the force is confused as in the 
utterance “Can you reach the salt, please?”. The reversal of the normal subject-verb order 
suggests the force of a question, but the inclusion of the interjection “please” suggests the 
force of a request. In this case the utteree has a clue in the utterance itself of the utterer’s 
intentions, and the utterer would be justifiably upset if the person addressed replied “Yes, I 
can” and did not in fact pass the salt! 
 
Not all indirect speech acts are this obvious. In Case 11 (chapter 8) a philosopher of 
language fails to recognise one. By treating his wife’s words as a question, and not as a 
request, he experienced her wrath. But there was a clue that he should have recognised. 
Martinich admits that he knew that his wife knew that he did not drink tea (Martinich 2001 
p 26). This should have caused him to ask himself why she asked a question to which she 
already knew the answer. Had he done so, he might have extracted the correct meaning 
from his wife’s utterance. 
 
In order to cope with this type of utterance there is again a three-step process. 
Step One 
Extract the literal meaning of the utterance. 
Step Two 
Ask yourself whether in all the circumstances it is reasonable to take this as the 
intended meaning.  The tests of reasonableness might include: 
 
  Does the force implied by the literal meaning fit naturally into the circumstances? For 
example, why in the middle of a meal would my dinner companion ask a question about 
the extent of my reach; or why after I have spilled my coffee all over her dress would 
she make a complement such as “you are clever!”? 
 
  Does the force implied by the literal meaning fit my previous knowledge of the utterer? 
In the case of Martinich (Case 11 p 51 above) he admits that he knew that his wife Mind, Meaning and Miscommunication 
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knew that he did not drink tea, which might have led him to reject the literal meaning of 
his wife’s question. 
Step Three 
If Step Two yields the answer No, then try to construct the meaning that was 
intended. 
 
In many cases this process can draw on the meaning of at least some part of the 
utterance. This is shown by the case of the dinner companion and the question about 
reaching the salt: the key is the term “salt”. But sometimes the utteree must look outside the 
utterance itself for the answer. If your wife asks you “Are you feeling that draught?” you 
must ask yourself whether she is simply asking you whether you are feeling the draught 
that she is feeling, or whether she is in fact asking you to do something about it by closing 
the offending door or window. An utterance with the form of a question might in this case 
have the force of a request (or should that be order!). 
 
In this section I considered how we can extract the intended meaning from 
utterances that comprise indirect speech acts. I suggested that having determined the literal 
meaning of the utterance concerned, we need to question whether in all the circumstances 
that was the intended meaning. If we decide that it was not, we use the literal meaning and 
any other available clues, including our experience of previous utterances by the utterer, to 
decide on the intended meaning. In the following section I briefly discuss how this same 
approach should be used when faced with propaganda. 
12.4 Spotting the flaws in sales talk 
 
In chapter 9 I discussed situations in which the utterer has two different meanings in 
mind when forming the utterance. This is particularly significant when the utterance is 
designed to persuade the utteree to a particular course of action or point of view, such as 
party political utterances and sales literature.  
 
The process to be followed in this case is similar to that outlined for indirect speech 
acts. In this case the steps to be taken are: 
Step One 
Extract the obvious meaning from the utterance.  
Step Two 
Ask yourself whether this meaning is designed to persuade you to a particular point 
of view or a particular course of action that you would not otherwise take. 
Step Three 
Consider whether the wording of the utterance could be understood with a different 
meaning that would fail to persuade you. If there is such a meaning, consider whether to act 
on the obvious one or the hidden one. 
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This process can be illustrated from Case 13. The obvious meaning of the first 
utterance (ignoring the small print) is that you have won a lot of money. Since the utterance 
has come from a sales company, it seems highly likely that this is intended to persuade you 
to do something. Look at the utterance again and notice the small print. The utterance 
meaning is now that you have won some money ONLY IF you meet certain criteria – some 
of which are outside your control. It is wise therefore to extract the second less obvious 
meaning. 
12.5 Conclusion 
 
In this chapter I examined a number of situations in which the utteree should reject 
the literal (and usually obvious) meaning of an utterance and look for a less obvious (or 
hidden) meaning. This includes cases where the utterer has clearly confused terms within 
the utterance, cases where it appears that the utterance is an indirect speech act, and cases 
of utterances designed to be persuasive. 
 
This brings to an end my examination of the process of extracting meaning from 
utterances. It also completes my examination of cases of miscommunication in order to 
learn lessons about meaning. In the final part of the thesis I bring together the lessons 
learned by first discussing the meaning of ‘meaning’, and then by reviewing how meaning 
is handled by the mind. Mind, Meaning and Miscommunication 
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CHAPTER 13: MEANING AND TERMS 
In this chapter I begin to draw together the various ideas about meaning gleaned 
from the cases of miscommunication discussed in the preceding chapters, and attempt from 
them to construct a coherent account of meaning as it relates to terms. This will form the 
necessary groundwork for the following chapter where I consider the meaning of 
expressions and sentences. To avoid repetition of detailed arguments I refer to previous 
sections of the thesis by the use of square brackets. 
 
After a discussion of the number of logical levels within a theory of meaning, I 
discuss the role of mind in meaning. Following this, I examine in some detail the role of 
senseF. I suggest some modification to Frege’s definition of senseF, passing on the way the 
issue of speech communities. I end with a summary of how meanings and terms are related. 
13.1 Dichotomy or trichotomy? 
 
Philosophers of language have long argued about the number of levels of 
explanation for a theory of meaning. Various terms have been used for a dichotomous 
approach, such as ‘atomistic’ and ‘molecular’ (Dummett 1976 p 72), ‘top-down’ and 
‘bottom-up’ (Blackburn 1984 pp 273ff), or simply “word meaning” and “sentence 
meaning”.  
 
I suggest that these attempts to define a dichotomy are misleading, if not actually 
wrong, and that for two reasons. In the first place a strong case can be made for three, 
rather than two, levels of analysis. Frege uses the terms ‘words’, ‘expressions’ and 
‘complete sentences’ to mark this trichotomy (Frege 2001 p 201), although others use 
‘phrase’ rather than ‘expression’. As previously discussed [1.3] the term ‘word’ is difficult 
to pin down, and I have preferred to use ‘term’ instead.  The terminology I will adopt is 
therefore ‘term’, ‘expression’ and ‘sentence’, although, as discussed below, I subdivide 
‘term’ into ‘simple term’ and ‘compound term’.  
 
Most modern approaches to grammar such as Halliday’s (Bloor and Bloor 1995) 
and Chomsky’s (Cook and Newsom 1996) allow for the unrestricted interchange of noun 
and noun phrase or verb and verb phrase. This is because a noun phrase performs the same 
syntactic function as a noun, as also verb phrase and verb. But when we consider meaning, 
there is a clear distinction between terms and expressions. The simple terms “wife”, 
“prime” and “minister” all have their individual meanings, and the meaning of the 
expression “wife of the prime minister” is built up from those meanings (see chapter 14). 
The simple terms “slow” and “worm” have their individual meanings, but the compound 
term “slow worm” is not built up from those meanings, and does not refer to a worm, but to 
a lizard. For these reasons I suggest that any theory of meaning must include separate 
meaning explanations for terms and expressions. 
 
My second reason for objecting to a dichotomous top/down distinction is that 
meaning is neither one nor the other, but both. I will return to this point in chapter 15. For 
the moment it is sufficient to emphasise the three-fold level of analysis that I propose to 
adopt.  Mind, Meaning and Miscommunication 
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13.2 In three minds 
 
Throughout this thesis I have talked about the utterer, the utterance and the utteree. 
It is perfectly clear that in the first and last of these we are concerned with the mind of the 
person: meaning is expressed or extracted by the mind. But there is a danger of forgetting 
the role of mind when we come to the literal meaning of an utterance. Each token of an 
utterance is a physical entity – a sequence of sounds, a series of signs, or a row of marks on 
a surface. But the meaning of the utterance is not physical, nor is it some non-physical 
property of the utterance to be uncovered by a mind. 
 
It is generally held that the literal meaning of an utterance is the key to finding the 
intended meaning and that these are frequently different (see, for example, Miller 1998 pp 
56-59). This is often expressed as though this literal meaning exists “out there” in the 
world. Putnam famously expressed his opposition to internalist approaches to meaning 
[4.5] as “meaning’s ain’t in the head” (Putnam 2001 p 291). Although at first glance this 
may appear to claim that meanings are outside the mind, applying the rule of charity 
suggests that his objection should be taken to be to locating meaning in the mind of the 
utterer, rather than in the minds of the speech community as a whole. I return to this issue 
in chapter 15. 
 
An extreme example of the difference between intentional meaning and literal 
meaning is provided by statutes that have been determined in a court of law to mean 
something other than the intention of Parliament (Blackburn 1984 p 132). It may be 
tempting in such cases to take the Fregean view and to see literal meaning as some non-
physical entity outside of the mind that the mind can in some way perceive, or, perhaps 
better, become directly acquainted with by a cognitive process analogous to perception. 
 
Despite my adoption of many features of Frege’s analysis, I take him to be wrong in 
this case. The view I take in this thesis is that meaning is a mental phenomenon: there can 
be no meaning without mind; meaning is created by mind. I will treat literal meaning as the 
meaning in the mind of a competent language user, who lacks the contextual clues available 
to a specific utteree.  
13.3 Fregean sense and perception 
 
Since Frege’s famous distinction between senseF and referenceF [6.1], the latter 
concept has been widely accepted and developed by philosophers of language. ReferenceF 
however provides an inadequate basis for a general theory of meaning, since many terms 
and expressions lack a referenceF. In this section I begin to consider whether senseF can 
offer a sound basis for a theory of meaning in relation to terms, by reviewing how Frege 
explains the concept. I follow this in succeeding sections with some proposed modifications 
to the concept. 
 
The first obvious advantage of senseF is that it can apply to terms that do not have a 
referenceF, as that term is generally understood. The second advantage is that senseF can 
explain differences of meaning when there is common referenceF, as in the Frege’s 
discussion of the terms ‘morning star’ and ‘evening star’ (Frege 2001 p 202). Mind, Meaning and Miscommunication 
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It is hardly surprising, giving the date at which Frege was writing, that his attempts 
to explain exactly what senseF is are confused and confusing. He distinguishes the senseF 
from the image [1.4] but claims that senseF is neither objective (ie not the object perceived) 
nor subjective (not the image of the object) but somewhere in between. His claim is that 
two people seeing the same object have an individual image of that object but a common 
senseF of it (Frege 2001 p 201). This is shown diagrammatically in the figure below. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 13.1 Frege’s explanation of sense 
 
For Frege, senseF is the common link, notional rather than physical, that determines 
that, when I first learn the term ‘table’ and you first learn the term ‘table,’ we associate the 
term with tokens of the same type. This, of course, assumes that we are part of the same 
speech community (see below) and that no error occurs in the process of acquiring the term 
[4.1]. 
 
Having summarised in this section what Frege says about senseF, I go on in the 
following sections to suggest some amendments to the meaning of the term. I begin by 
considering the application of senseF to non-real entities. 
13.4 Sense and the imaginary 
 
Frege focussed his discussion of senseF on real entities, both mathematical and 
perceptual. In this section I want to extend the use of the term to incorporate the target of 
all terms, whether real or imaginary. Before doing so, it may help if I restate my 
categorisation of learning processes and their accompanying representations. 
 
I suggested, firstly, on the basis of empirical evidence of how children acquire 
language that we are born with a limited number of innate concepts, which I will refer to 
hereafter as “i-cepts”, and that children match some terms from their communal language 
with those i-cepts [3.2].  It may be misleading to view these i-cepts as representing 
something. If, for example, there exists a particular pattern of neurons in the brain that 
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perform the same function as an “AND” gate does within a computer, it might be argued 
whether this represents the concept “and” or is that concept? I will nevertheless refer to 
them as representations for simplicity. 
 
In the case of things that we learn about through experience and through education, 
we acquire, I have suggested, three types of representation. The first to be acquired are 
perceptual representations, which I will term “p-cepts” and these relate to objects, to 
actions, to events and to properties [4.1 and 4.2].  
 
The second type of representations are concepts that derive from perceptions, which 
I will call “c-cepts”. Children can develop concepts from terms that they have learned 
ostensively [item (ii) on page 37].  For example, having learnt ‘dog’ and ‘cat’ and ‘cow’ 
they might recognise they have something in common and gain the concept ‘animal’ before 
they actually learn the term. Such concepts are to be distinguished from those that arise 
through the process of learning “by description” [5.1 and 5.2], and I will use the term “d-
cepts”  for the representations of such concepts. 
 
I have therefore described four different forms of representation to which the 
representations of terms may be linked: i-cepts, p-cepts, c-cepts and d-cepts, which I will 
jointly refer to simply as representations. There is an obvious distinction between the first 
category and the other three. In the former case there is no external feature, whether real or 
imaginary: these terms relate to innate concepts. I shall refer to the other three jointly as 
‘pcd-cepts'.  
 
All terms (and I specifically exclude expressions from this statement – I will return 
to them in the next chapter) are linked to a representation. If the Russellian approach to 
meaning is adopted, then referenceF is denied to all non-existent entities and ways have to 
be found to reformulate sentences with non-referring terms into sentences that only contain 
referring terms. The opposite approach is Meinongianism: the concept that some entities 
exist (that is, meet Russell’s standard for referenceF) and others subsist (that is, fail 
Russell’s test but still ‘are’ is some sense). Whilst the latter is a controversial and difficult 
concept, it is to my mind no more difficult that the concept of possible worlds. 
 
It is possible, however, to overcome the problem of non-referring terms if we 
modify the meaning of senseF. Instead of adopting Frege’s explantion of a weird concept 
that is neither objective nor subjective, I propose to equate senseF with representations. The 
senseF of a term is thus the representation in the mind that is linked to the representation of 
the term, as shown in the following diagram, using sight as an example. Mind, Meaning and Miscommunication 
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Figure 13.2 Locating sense in the mind 
 
Understanding senseF in this way provides a consistent explanation for meaning in 
the case of terms. The meaning of a term is the senseF of that term, that is the perceptual, 
conceptual or descriptive representation in the mind of whatever the terms relates to.  Two 
points should be noted. First, what a term “relates” to is whatever it was that triggered the 
formation of the relevant representation. I avoid use of the term “refers” because the 
representation may have been triggered by something for which no reference exists, such as 
the name Santa Claus in a story.  
 
Secondly, this meaning of a term in the mind arises, ignoring the issue of error, 
because of the way in which that term is used by the speech community (see 13.7 below). 
The relationship between meaning in the mind and meaning in the language is a case of 
“chicken and egg”: each gives rise to the other, and which comes first is of no practical 
relevance to the day to day operation of language.  
 
I have now outlined what I call “term meaning”, and in the next chapter I discuss 
how term meaning relates to expression meaning and sentence meaning. Before doing so, I 
must consider some other issues relating to senseF. 
13.5 Sense and modes of presentation 
 
In his explanation of how different senseFs can have the same referenceF, Frege 
introduces a concept that is now usually termed “mode of presentation”. By this he means 
that the senseF of a term may be acquired by a different route. Using the example of 
Snowdon and Yr Wyddfa as an example (see Blackburn 1984 pp 328ff), I may come to 
know Snowdon by climbing it via the mountain railway and therefore think of it as a 
relatively easy ascent. Later looking at a map of the area I may see the name Yr Wyddfa 
and from the contour lines identify a very steep slope. There have been different modes of 
presentation of the same object and therefore different senseFs of that object, and unless I 
am told that Yr Wyddfa is Snowdon I may think that the two senseFs relate to two different 
mountains. 
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Modes of presentation can also differ as between individuals. Consider the case 
where A grows up in the country and learns the term ‘fox’ ostensively whereas B grows up 
in the town and learns the term by description.  This is different to the situation pictured in 
Figure 13.1 above, where A and B have the same perceptual experience when they acquire 
a term. I suggest that in this situation it is both logical and helpful to consider A and B to 
have different senseFs of ‘fox’, and therefore different meanings, even though there is a 
common referenceF and there will be a large overlap between the two senseFs. 
 
At this point it may be useful to summarise the picture so far. If A and B learn the 
name of the same object at the same time, they have their own individual image of the 
object, but (as tokens of the same type) they have the same senseF. If A and B learn the 
name of the same object via the same mode of presentation at different times, they also 
have their own individual image, but the same senseF. If A and B learn the name of the 
same object by different modes of presentation, they have different perceptual 
representations (p-cepts, c-cepts or d-cepts depending on the specific mode of presentation) 
and thus different senseFs, ie different meanings.  
 
In the following section I explore further the implications of this approach for 
meaning as regards terms. 
13.6 How senses can differ 
 
If I am right about innate concepts and how the terms for them are acquired, then all 
the members of a speech community should, generally speaking, associate the same 
relational terms with the same innate relational concepts. The situation with non-innate 
terms is more problematic, since we can learn such terms in different ways and thus may 
have different senseFs. Let us take one simple term as an example. 
 
A learns the term ‘animal’ ostensively as her parents point to various animals over a 
period of time and accompany each occasion by saying “animal”. Her senseF of the term 
therefore comprises a p-cept. B acquires the concept through her own thought processes, 
recognising the common characteristics of cats, dogs and cows and then recognises the 
match between that concept and the use in her speech community of the term ‘animal’. Her 
senseF of the term ‘animal’ therefore comprises a c-cept. C acquires the term by being 
taught it, that is by description, so that her senseF comprises a d-cept. (That d-cept is, of 
course, linked to p-cepts, c-cepts and i-cepts that have been previously acquired [5.1 & 5.2 
and figure 5.1]. 
 
Although A, B and C have different senseFs for the term ‘animal’ it will be clear 
that there is significant overlap. It is possible that B’s concept of animal does not include 
birds, for example, whereas A’s and C’s senseFs of the term both include birds. 
Nevertheless, there is sufficient overlap for them to communicate and it is probable that at 
some stage A and B will modify their senseF of the term through reading or schooling. 
 
It is a fact of life (and of philosophy!) that we do not always mean the same thing by 
the terms that we use. Nevertheless there is sufficient commonality of meaning for 
reasonably successful communication. I shall return to this point in the next chapter. Mind, Meaning and Miscommunication 
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One final point about senseF needs to be made. This is that the link between term 
and senseF for each individual is, under normal circumstances, determined by their speech 
community. Unless I intend to introduce a neologism, I use a term to express my meaning 
because, setting aside the possibility of error [4.1 & 4.3], I have associated that meaning 
with that term because of how that term is used by the speech community. It is therefore 
important at this point to clarify the concept of speech community. 
13.7 Speech communities 
 
I have referred to the term ‘speech community’ or its synonyms throughout this 
thesis without any discussion of the meaning of the term. In this section I set out how I 
understand and use the term. 
 
There is no precise definition of what constitutes a language.  Is Serbo-Croat a 
single language, or are Serbian and Croatian different languages because they use a 
different script (slavonic and roman respectively) and are spoken in what are today separate 
countries? Are Dutch and Flemish separate languages or the same language with two names 
based on nationality? There can be no definitive answer to these questions, they depend 
upon one’s point of view. 
 
There is a similar problem with speech communities. If we take English as our 
starting point, is Glasgow a different speech community from Newcastle?  Case 16 (p 61) 
illustrates the communication problems faced when a boy from Kent speaks to a girl from 
Newcastle, and fails to recognise that she is not speaking German. How many English-
speakers born outside Scotland can understand the language of Burns? In this thesis I take a 
flexible concept of speech community that varies for each individual from time to time. 
 
Speech communities form a grid, as illustrated in the following diagram, and for 
each of us the relevant speech community will depend upon the circumstances (a) in which 
we acquire meaning and (b) in which we are expressing meaning or extracting meaning. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 13.3 Interrelationship of speech communities 
 
Hobby 
Language 
Scientific 
Language 
Literary 
Language 
Normal 
language 
World-wide English-
speaking community 
Native English-
speakers (British, 
American etcetera) 
National English-
speaking community 
(eg Britain) 
Local English-speaking 
community (eg Glasgow) 
Family and friends 
etc Mind, Meaning and Miscommunication 
83 
It will be clear from this diagram that our speech community varies according to 
circumstances, and that failure to recognise this fact can lead to miscommunication. If I 
learned the senseF of ‘vest’ in an American English speech community and then used the 
term within a British English speech community, my utterees would have a different 
senseF, since in American English ‘vest’ relates to the article of clothing that in British 
English is called ‘waistcoat’. In the same way, the term ‘reference’ has a different senseF in 
the normal and literary speech communities than it has in the philosophical language 
community. 
13.8 Conclusions 
 
At this point I can summarise my conclusions about meaning and terms. 
 
1.   The concept of senseF, as outlined by Frege, offers a possible basis for a theory of the 
meaning of terms, subject to modification. 
 
2.   When terms are acquired there are four different types of representation to one of 
which the representation of the term is linked: these are innate concepts (i-cepts),  
perceptual (p-cepts), conceptual – derived from perceptions (c-cepts), and conceptual –
acquired by description (d-cepts), the latter three jointly referred to as pcd-cepts. 
 
3.  I consider the senseF of a term to be this mental representation of whatever the term 
relates to, and equate this sense with the meaning of the term. 
 
I use the term “relational meaning” for representations that relate to innate concepts 
(i-cepts) and “non-innate meaning” for all other representations (pcd-cepts). For brevity I 
also speak of innate terms and non-innate terms, meaning the terms related to innate and 
non-innate representations. The reasons behind this differentiation will appear later.  
 
I return to the practical issue of how senseF fits into a general theory of meaning in 
chapter 15, after I focus in the next chapter on the meaning of expressions and sentences. 
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CHAPTER 14: MEANING, EXPRESSIONS AND SENTENCES 
In this chapter I continue to examine the lessons learned about meaning from 
instances of miscommunication, applying them to the issue of expressions and sentences. 
This provides the basis, together with the previous chapter, for the concluding chapter 
where I outline an overall concept of meaning. 
 
After restating my objection to truth conditions as an explanation of meaning, I 
review the conclusion that I came to about Mentalese and about the various ways by which 
children acquire meaning. From these conclusions I suggest an explanation for the literal 
meaning of expressions and sentences, and go on to discuss how intended meaning relates 
to literal meaning. 
14.1 Meaning and truth conditions 
 
I have previously set out several reasons why it is wrong to explain the meaning of 
sentences by reference to truth conditions [2.4 and 2.5]. I am not denying that truth 
conditions can be set for entities such as assertions and propositions, and acknowledge that 
many philosophers have used the term ‘meaning’ to describe the relationship between truth 
conditions and such entities.  
 
What I am asserting is that meaning in that senseD cannot be applied to language in 
general, nor provide the basis for a general theory of meaning. In the remainder of this 
chapter I will outline an alternative understanding of meaning in relation to expressions and 
sentences. 
14.2 Mentalese and relational terms 
 
In this section I review the relationship between Mentalese and innate terms. In 
section 3.3 I suggested that, contrary to Fodor’s claims, our innate language of thought is 
limited to relatively few concepts (ie relational meanings [13.8]). I suggested a possible list 
of innate concepts, and apart from some ontological categories, the concepts I included 
were essentially relational in character. The relationships involved were grammatical, 
logical, spatial, temporal and quantitative. The terms for these innate concepts were 
acquired, I suggested, by the process of matching their use in our communal language with 
these concepts (which I have termed i-cepts).  
 
I suggested in chapter 3 that these innate concepts plus perceptions (p-cepts) from 
everyday experience (unrelated to language) are sufficient to explain the ability of 
languageless people (prelanguage children and languageless adults) to think. Such thinking 
would involve the recognition of relationships between different perceptions and could 
result, for example, in the acquisition of c-cepts (see 13.5) as well as the learning of simple 
skills [3.2]. The three elements (i-cepts, p-cepts and c-cepts) would provide such 
individuals with the vocabulary of their language of thought, even though they have no 
communal language. 
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The essential difference that the possession of a communal language brings is the 
ability to acquire knowledge by description [5.1], which provides a vast increase in the 
number of concepts of which we have knowledge (ie d-cepts) as well as the ability to 
communicate far more fluently. The representation of a term learned by description (a 
string of relatively few symbols) will inevitably be more compact than the representation of 
the description for that term (see figure 5.1 p 37). It would therefore be more efficient when 
thinking to use the representation of the term rather than the description representation (the 
d-cept) as the Mentalese word. 
 
If this is correct, then our use of language would in essence be no more than the 
outward expression of inward thinking. Before I explore the implications of this, I need first 
to expand the list of relational concepts that I am assuming are innate. 
14.3 Further innate concepts 
 
In chapter 3 I gave the following examples of innate concepts. 
 
  Grammatical relationships, such as subject, direct object, indirect object 
  Logical operators Not (), And (&), Or (v), Material implication (), Iff () 
  Comparison relationships: Equal, More and Less (for physical properties such as length, 
area and volume) 
  Spatial relationships such as in, out, on, under, to and from 
  Temporal relationships such as when, before and after 
  Quantitative concepts such as all, most, many and some. 
 
I now want to suggest a few more innate relational concepts, beginning with the 
several relationships expressed in English by the verb ‘to be’. These are: 
 
  The predicate relationship (“John is bald”)  
  The descriptive relationship (“a mountain is a very big hill”)  
  The representational relationship (pointing to a map “this is our street”) 
 
In addition, there is a relationship (or perhaps a group of related relationships – it 
does not matter which for present purposes) that is expressed by the English word “of”. 
There is also the relationship that I can best describe as the “under discussion” relationship, 
expressed in English by some uses of relative pronouns. 
 
This last case brings me to a crucial point. I am not proposing that there is a one-to-
one relationship between relational terms and relational meanings. Some relational 
meanings can be expressed by different relational terms (“the man is in the house”, or “the 
man is inside the house”, or “the man is within the house”). Some relational meanings can 
be expressed by syntactic structure, rather than by a specific relational term. Compare “the 
cat on the mat is fat” with “the cat that is on the mat is fat”; or take the sentence “More 
haste, less speed” where the → relationship is not matched by an actual term.  
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Before I discuss how these i-cepts contribute to expression and sentence meaning, I 
must comment briefly on term meanings that also involve relationships. 
14.4 Relational non-innate terms  
 
Many of the terms that we acquire, other than those relating to i-cepts, have a 
relational aspect. Some non-innate terms imply a relationship, but do not require that it be 
specified. Examples of this are “mother” that implies a relationship with children, “lid” that 
implies a relationship with a container, or “roof” that implies a building. I can form a 
correct sentence such as “the roof is leaking” without making specific reference to the 
related building, or I can be more specific and say “the roof of the shed is leaking”.  
 
Other terms, in particular transitive verbs, require that an additional term be 
expressed to create a well-formed sentence (such as “he hit the ball” or “she dropped her 
book”). Some verbs require an indirect object as well as a direct object (“he gave his tutor 
the essay”).   
 
There is, as will become clear below, an essential difference between the relational 
aspect of innate terms (related to i-cepts) and those of non-innate terms (related to pcd-
cepts). I will use ‘relational term’ and ‘relational meanings’ without further qualification to 
refer only to innate senseFs. The relational aspects of non-innate terms I will disregard as an 
element of meaning. 
14.5 Expression meaning 
 
I am now in a position to explain meaning in relation to expressions, based on the 
division of terms between innate relational terms, whose meanings are i-cepts, and non-
innate terms, whose meaning are pcd-cepts. The meaning of an expression, I shall claim, 
consists in the combination of pcd-cepts with i-cepts. 
 
The expression “the lid of the pan” relates the non-innate terms “lid” and “pan” with 
the innate term “of”, and the meaning of the expression is the combination of the non-
innate meaning with the relational meaning. From the sentence “the cat on the mat is fat” 
we can extract the expression “the cat on the mat”. Here again there are two non-innate 
meanings (of “cat” and “‘mat”) combined with the relational meaning of “on”.  
 
It is the essential difference between the two types of meaning (innate and non-
innate) that make these combinations possible. One way of explaining this is to think of 
non-innate meanings as bricks, relational meanings as mortar. You do not form an 
expression by simply laying meanings in a row (“glasses”, “on”, “table”). You join the non-
innate meanings with the mortar of a relational meaning. It is this dichotomy that avoids 
falling foul of Aristotle’s “third man” charge. 
 
What I have discussed so far in this section is the literal meaning of expressions. 
Any satisfactory theory of meaning must also cope with expressions that have a 
metaphorical meaning. An expression such as “spend a penny” has both a literal meaning 
constructed, as I have claimed, from the combination of its non-innate and innate meanings, Mind, Meaning and Miscommunication 
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and a metaphorical meaning that attaches to the expression as a whole. I will return to this 
issue in chapter 15. 
 
It should be clear that this approach avoids the problem of non-referring 
expressions. Since I have claimed that all terms have meaning (whether innate or non-
innate) it follows that all expressions (which are formed by combining non-innate and  
innate meanings) have meaning: that is the literal meaning of the expression. An expression 
such as “the series with the least convergence” does have a meaning that we can 
comprehend, even though it has no referenceF (Frege 2001 p 200). 
 
Before I can extend this concept of meaning from expressions to complete 
sentences, there is one category of innate concept that I have so far ignored. In the 
following section therefore I discuss the concept of force, and relate it to the meaning of 
sentences. 
14.6 Force and sentence meaning 
 
I have made reference previously [6.5] to Frege’s concept of force, that which  
separates, for example, a statement from a question. Four common types of speech act that 
are differentiated by force are: 
 
  Statements (“You are tall”) 
  Questions (“Are you tall?”) 
  Commands (“Stand tall!”) 
  Wishes (“If only you were tall”) 
 
The force of a sentence may be marked in various ways. In English, statements and 
questions can be differentiated by word order, by intonation or punctuation. In other 
languages, wishes and commands may be indicated by different forms of the verb. In some 
cases the force of a sentence may be marked by lexical choice. 
 
In the previous section I used the sentence “the cat on the mat is fat” and extracted 
the expression “the cat on the mat”. What marks the latter as an expression and not a 
sentence? I suggest that the distinctive indication of a sentence, as opposed to an 
expression, is the presence of a force marker. The complete sentence “the cat on the mat is 
fat” can, I suggest, be analysed as an expression (“the cat on the mat”), a non-innate term 
(“fat”), a relational term (“is”) and a force marker (hidden in the syntax). 
 
Philosophers of language from Russell onwards have explored the idea of logical 
form underlying natural language sentences.  Use is made of tools such as quantification 
and predicate calculus to explore and explain the underlying structure of sentences. The 
proposal outlined in the preceding two sections is not intended as a replacement for such 
tools, but simply as a means to explain how meaning can be understood. 
 
The meaning of a well-formed sentence is, I suggest, formed by the combination of 
two or more non-innate term meanings and/or expression meanings with relational 
meanings and a force marker. This combination provides the literal meaning of utterances. Mind, Meaning and Miscommunication 
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The approach will become clearer when I discuss below firstly how we express intended 
meaning and then how we extract it. 
14.7 The expression of intended meaning 
 
I begin with the process of expressing meaning. I have previously dismissed Grice’s 
approach to explaining meaning [4.5], in part on the grounds that he fails to account for the 
acquisition of the terms used by the utterer to construct an utterance. (My one exception 
was the introduction of a new term by an utterer; a rare event that probably never occurs for 
the majority of language users). Nevertheless I am in this section following Grice to the 
extent that I will relate the literal meaning of an utterance to the intended meaning of the 
utterer. 
 
In the previous chapter I gave a brief explanation of why each of us may have 
different senseFs (ie meanings) for terms that we have learnt. It is also a fact of life that we 
do not only communicate to share our thoughts but also to lie, to amuse, to persuade and so 
on. But for the moment I will focus on the simple case in which we wish to make a 
statement. 
 
The situation is that my wife cannot find her glasses. I can see them on the table and 
I wish to convey this fact to her. I could do so by simply linking two non-innate terms with 
one relational term: “glasses on table”. However, the particular grammatical rules of 
English require that this simple structure be expanded to “the glasses are on the table”. 
 
The process I am outlining begins with the meaning in the mind of the utterer. This 
meaning is formed of two types of representation: innate and non-innate and is constructed 
in the language of thought. This meaning could still be present in the mind of an individual 
without any communal language. By tracing the links from these representations to the 
representations of the related terms in the communal language, and then applying the 
grammatical rules of that communal language to order and modify the terms, the utterer 
constructs an utterance that expresses the internal meaning. 
 
In this section I have looked briefly at how we construct a sentence to express our 
intended meaning, using a combination of non-innate terms, expressions, relational terms 
and a force marker. In the following section I will consider the reasons why the literal 
meaning of an utterance may differ from the intended meaning. 
14.8 Differences between intended meaning and literal meaning 
 
The twin questions to be addressed in this section are (a) why does intended 
meaning rarely equate exactly to literal meaning and (b) how do they differ? I begin with 
the first of these. 
 
The complaint is sometimes made that natural languages lack logical rigidity. The 
language faculty has evolved over many millennia and like all other aspects of evolution its 
present form arises from random changes that proved to have some advantage. Our bodies 
would be different if they had been designed initially to be bipedal; our language would be Mind, Meaning and Miscommunication 
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different if it had been designed ab initio as a logical structure. For these reasons language 
involves the best compromise between competing pressures and is inevitably less than 
perfect. 
 
There are two other factors to take into account. We are human and therefore prone 
to error, so we do not always learn language correctly. There have been several recent 
complaints, for example, about politicians and BBC presenters using the term ‘refute’ when 
they mean ‘deny’. It may be that the term ‘refute’ is changing its meaning. If most of the 
speech community use the term ‘refute’ as a synonym for ‘deny’, then it may be the 
complainers who are wrong! Nevertheless, it remains true that we do make mistakes in our 
use of language. It is also a fact, or at least a claim based on empirical psychological 
experiments, that we are not always rational in our thinking (see for example Bermudez 
2005 p 145). 
 
There are therefore three general reasons why the literal meaning of our utterance 
may not match the meaning that we intended. I now look at some more specific reasons for 
these differences and how they occur. 
 
  We wish to be polite, and therefore adopt a circumlocution. It is a matter of subjective 
judgement when a euphemism becomes so commonplace that it can be treated as a 
complex term. How should we regard a sentence such as “I wish to spend a penny”: 
does it literally mean that I wish to spend a small coin, but have a different intended 
meaning; or should we treat “to spend a penny” as a complex term forming a synonym 
with “to urinate”? 
 
  We wish to be poetic and convey emotion as well as fact. We therefore use a metaphor 
and expect the utteree to recognise the emotive reasons for our choice of terms. One 
common ploy is to use anthropomorphisms such as “the trees wept multicoloured tears 
as they were buffeted by autumn winds”. 
 
  We wish to convey a concept for which no literal word exists and make use of a 
metaphor, as in “the news trickled into the office”. 
 
  We wish to persuade or mislead and we choose a term where we want the utteree to 
extract the wrong intended meaning. I have illustrated this previously [9.3] with 
sentences such as “Nothing is faster than A” where the intended meaning to be 
conveyed is “A is the fastest and nothing else is as fast”. 
 
  We wish to make our personal attitude clear by selecting terms that have a clear 
connotation of, for example, praise or blame. “She was a bitch” or “her cooking is 
heavenly”. 
 
Having outlined in this section the processes by which the utterer expresses the 
intended meaning in an utterance, I now turn to the converse – how the utteree can extract 
that meaning. Mind, Meaning and Miscommunication 
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14.9 Extracting the intended meaning 
 
In this section I turn to the question of how the utteree is to extract the intended 
meaning from an utterance. I have already made some comments on this process in chapter 
12, but I want to pull the various points made there into a more coherent strategy. 
 
Finding the intended meaning begins with recognising the literal meaning (see the 
quotation from Platts on page 71). We do that by applying the rules of grammar to identify 
the term meanings and expression meanings involved, and linking them with the relational 
terms used and a force marker. I will return to this process in more detail in the following 
chapter. In some cases there may be more than one possible literal meaning, and I will 
therefore begin the process of extracting the intended meaning with the issue of ambiguity 
 
If the literal meaning is ambiguous, the utteree must look for a clue in the utterance 
itself or in the immediate context to disambiguate it. Take the sentence “Always drive on 
the right side of the road”. This is ambiguous because right can mean either ‘correct’ or ‘the 
opposite side to where the majority of people have their heart’. If the context is “take care 
whichever country you are driving in” then the former senseF appears correct. If the context 
is “In Britain we drive on the left but when you holiday in France” then the latter senseF 
fits. If no clue can be found, consider whether the ambiguity is intended and forms part of 
the intended meaning. I gave the example previously of the slogan for a security company: 
“we have a reputation to protect” is deliberately ambiguous. 
 
Assuming that any unintended ambiguity has been resolved, how is the utteree then 
to derive the intended meaning from the literal meaning? I suggest that some of the 
following questions are relevant. 
 
  Is it charitable to assume that the speaker intends the literal meaning? If a man’s wife 
appears looking extremely beautiful as they prepare to go out on a special occasion and 
he says “why ever did I marry you?”, is it charitable to assume he genuinely means that 
he wonders why he got married? Charity suggests that he intends to pay his wife a 
compliment. 
 
  Is it logical to assume that the speaker intends the literal meaning? If a politician says “I 
refute that claim” but puts forward no arguments against the claim, is it logical to 
assume he means that he refutes it? Common sense says that he does not, and that the 
intended meaning is that he denies the claim. 
 
  Does the literal meaning imply something more than it actually states? This is the issue 
of implicature, which I discussed in section 11.4. There are various types of implicature 
which have been listed by Grice (2001b pp 169ff). A simple example is: 
 
A    I need to buy some bread. 
B    Jones is just round the corner Mind, Meaning and Miscommunication 
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. 
In this situation A in entitled to extract from the literal meaning of B’s utterance that 
Jones is a shop that sells bread. 
 
  Is the literal meaning nonsensical and if so, can it be understood metaphorically? My 
friend who is paraplegic tells me on the phone that when he heard the news “he jumped 
for joy”. I know that he could not literally jump, so I interpret his intended meaning as 
“I was extremely happy”. 
 
  Does the choice of term or pragmatic evidence suggest that connotation [6.4] has an 
impact upon the meaning? 
By following these steps, in most cases without conscious effort, the utteree is able 
to move from the literal meaning of an utterance to the intended meaning. 
14.10 Conclusion 
 
In this chapter I examined how the meaning of expressions relates to the meaning of 
terms, and the meaning of sentences relates to the meanings of both terms and expressions. 
I have identified some non-innate meanings of term that imply relationships with other such 
terms (as ‘roof’ implies ‘building’), but have distinguished these from innate relational 
meanings. I have restricted the terms ‘relational terms’ and ‘relational meanings’ to the 
latter, and have proposed that the difference between non-innate meanings and innate 
(relational) meanings is analogous to the difference between bricks and mortar.  
 
The literal meaning of an expression, I claimed, is formed by the combination of 
two or more non-innate meanings with one or more relational meanings. Relational 
meanings in an expression can be marked by individual terms or by the rules of grammar. 
The combination of the meaning of expressions with the meaning of other non-innate terms 
and relational terms plus a force marker creates sentence meaning.  
 
I outlined a number of reasons why literal meaning may not align with intended 
meaning, and listed some of the ways in which intended meaning can be extracted from 
literal meaning. In the final chapter I outline a theory of meaning and consider how that 
theory fits with the modular concept of mind. 
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CHAPTER 15: MEANING,  MIND AND MODULARITY 
In this concluding chapter I summarise the various facets of meaning that have been 
discussed in previous chapters, before outlining a theory of meaning and then exploring the 
implications of that theory for understanding how our minds handle meaning. I suggest a 
number of discrete processes that are involved in meaning, and relate these to the concept 
of the modularity of mind. 
15.1 The many facets of meaning 
 
It is clear, from the previous discussions of both the cases of miscommunication and 
the differing philosophical views about meaning, that there is no simple meaning of 
‘meaning’.  Grice has pointed out the difference between natural and non-natural meaning 
[4.4] and philosophy of mind is concerned only with the latter. That non-natural meaning is 
a complex issue has been emphasised, among others, by Strawson, who said that 
 
given that we know . . . the [literal] meaning of an utterance, there may 
still be a further question as to how what was said was meant by the 
speaker, or as to how the words spoken were used, or as to how the 
utterance was to be taken or ought to have been taken. (cited by Rainey 
2007 p7 – italics in original) 
 
The various facets of meaning that have been explored so far can be grouped into 
five as follows. Each group will be discussed in the succeeding sections. 
 
A.  Acquired meaning, expressed meaning, extracted meaning 
 
B.  Utterer’s meaning, utterance meaning, utteree’s meaning (each of which may  
comprise two different meanings, either aimed at one audience – as in a double 
entendre -- or at different audiences) 
 
C.  ReferenceF, senseF and connotation 
 
D.  Term meaning, expression meaning, sentence meaning 
 
E.  Literal meaning, metaphorical meaning, implied meaning 
15.2 Meaning in the mind of the individual 
 
In the case of Group A above, a theory of meaning must account for  
 
(a)  how any individual acquires the meaning of terms and the ability to combine those 
terms into expressions and sentences; 
 
(b)  how that individual expresses meaning in their utterances; and 
 
(c)  how they extract meaning from other people’s utterances. Mind, Meaning and Miscommunication 
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I discussed these abilities as part of an innate capacity for language (chapter 3). The 
evidence from the study of language learning by children is that these abilities are realised 
in processes that are in large part either subconscious (that is we are always unaware of 
them) or unconscious (we consciously learn them but then perform them without conscious 
control). This has important consequences for the philosophy of mind. 
 
I described four distinct ways in which we acquire meaning, linking the 
representation of terms to four different types of representation: innate concepts, and three 
types of learned representations – perceptions and perceptual concepts (together comprising 
knowledge by acquaintance), and taught concepts (knowledge by description). Because we 
are human and prone to error we may incorrectly link term and representation: indeed, 
making errors and subsequently correcting them is an essential aspect of the brain’s 
operation (Frith 2007 pp 95ff).  
 
The result is that my meaning of a term may differ in some respects from your 
meaning of that term and both may differ from the dictionary definition. In part these 
differences arise because individuals may learn about the same thing in different ways, that 
is have different senseFs of it. For example, A may know that Snowdon and Yr Wyddfa are 
one and the same mountain, whereas B may think that the two terms relate to different 
mountains. 
15.3 Meaning in communication 
 
In any act of communication we have three aspects of meaning, which I have 
termed “utterer’s meaning”, “utterance meaning” and “utteree’s meaning” (Group B in 
15.1). Horst expresses the distinction as follows: 
 
The verb ‘means’ does not express simply a two-place relationship 
between inscription and its semantic value; rather it must covertly report 
either (a) speaker meaning, (b) hearer interpretation or (c) interpretation 
licensed by a particular linguistic convention. (Horst 2005 p6) 
 
In the previous section I discussed two reasons why the utterer and utteree may have 
a different senseF, that is a different meaning, for the same term. They may equally have a 
different grasp of the grammatical rules of their language. I discussed previously how literal 
meaning can be viewed as the meaning of a third notional mind, or the common meaning in 
a group of minds, assuming competent disinterested language ability and access to a 
dictionary. Nevertheless, whether because of their competence or despite it, there may be 
differences in some aspects of linguistic ability as between the minds of the utterer and 
utteree and the third mind – the impartial arbiter of utterance meaning. 
 
The result of these differences is that the meaning of a term used in an utterance will 
often vary between the different parties. We are able to communicate because the various 
meanings overlap, as the following diagram illustrates. Mind, Meaning and Miscommunication 
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Figure 15.1 How overlap of meaning makes communication possible 
 
I also pointed out [chapter 9] that on some occasions the utterer may have two 
different meanings that they wish to express. On some occasions, such as in advertising 
blurb or in deliberate fraud, there may be one meaning directed at the authorities and a 
different meaning directed at the man in the street [9.3 & 9.4]. One other occasions, such as 
puns and advertising slogans, the utteree is intended to recognise both meanings: indeed the 
intended meaning is the combination of both individual meanings [9.2]. 
 
15.4 Reference, sense and connotation 
These three aspects of meaning (Group C above) were discussed in chapter 6. 
Although I have rejected referenceF as the basis for a general theory of meaning [13.3], this 
is not to deny that referenceF is relevant to meaning in those cases where there is both 
senseF and referenceF. I will discuss the role of senseF in a theory of meaning in 15.7 below. 
Connotation subsists, I suggest, in linkages formed between non-innate representations 
[13.8] and emotional memories, adding colour to the basic structure of meaning (see 15.7). 
15.5 Terms, expressions and sentences 
 
In the previous two chapters I have discussed in some detail the difference in the 
concept of meaning between terms, expressions and sentences (Group D above). The 
meaning of terms is acquired as discussed in chapters 3 to 5 and in 15.2 above.  They are of 
two types. Relational terms refer to innate relational concepts that are the basis of all 
thinking, both linguistic and non-linguistic.  These innate relational concepts, I have 
suggested, form the basic vocabulary of Mentalese. All other terms are related to 
perceptual, conceptual and descriptive representations (pcd-cepts) that are the meaning of 
these terms.  These representations, I suggest, form the remaining vocabulary of Mentalese. 
 
The meaning of expressions, I proposed, should be understood as the combination 
of non-innate meanings and innate relational meanings. But there is a difference in kind as 
between the two terms: if non-innate terms are the bricks of an expression, the relational 
terms are the mortar. An expression such as “house of cards” is brick, mortar, brick; not 
brick, brick, brick.  
 
The meaning of sentences is formed, I proposed, from the combination of non-
innate meanings and/or expression meanings with relational meanings and force markers 
[14.6 and 14.7]. This is not, however, to endorse the atomic or bottom-up theory of 
meaning [13.1], as I will explain in section 15.7, after discussing the last group of meaning 
facets and outlining a theory of meaning. 
Blue – utterer’s 
sense of the term 
Green – the literal  
sense of the term 
Red – utteree’s sense 
of the term 
White – the overlap of common 
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15.6 Literal, metaphorical and implied meanings 
 
Whether we are discussing an utterance from the viewpoint of the utterer, the 
utterance or the utteree, when we are dealing with expression and sentence meaning there 
are three forms of meaning to be considered (Group E in 15.1).  
 
The first of these is literal meaning, that is the meaning that a competent language 
user with access to a good dictionary would derive without the additional clues available to 
the utteree. A simple example would be the utterance “he kicked the bucket”. This has the 
literal meaning that the person referred to struck a particular type of container with his or 
her foot.  
 
This contrasts with the metaphorical meaning, where the phrase “to kick the bucket” 
is used as a synonym for “to die”.  But now consider the utterance in a slightly wider 
context.  
 
A   Why is Jim hopping about like that? 
B  He kicked the bucket. 
 
In this context there is the literal meaning but also implied meaning: the implication 
is that in kicking the bucket he hurt himself and the hopping is due to a painful foot. 
15.7 A theory of meaning 
 
Having set out in the previous five sections different aspects of meaning, and before 
going on to consider some implications for how meaning is actually handled in the mind, I 
need to make one final point, which is the most difficult to put into words. I have spoken 
throughout this thesis of terms, or expressions, or sentences or utterances having meaning. I 
have divided meaning in the previous five sections into various facets. 
 
I could not have found any other term than ‘meaning’ to express what I meant by 
these terms. Nevertheless, I believe that my use of the term is misleading. In section 2.3 (p 
15) I included a quotation by Jeffrey King about truth and sentences. That quotation ended 
with “a declarative sentence is true or false derivatively, in virtue of expressing . . . a true or 
false proposition” (King 2001 p 1).  I suggest that a parallel statement must be made about 
meaning. 
 
An utterance has meaning derivatively, by virtue of expressing mental 
meaning. 
 
That is, meaning is not at root a feature of communal languages: rather it is a mental 
feature, an aspect of the language of thought, which is expressed by a communal language. 
Meaning (as I have already recapped in 15.5) consists of (a) representations in the 
mind/brain of things (both real and imaginary) of which I have learned, (b) representations 
of innate concepts that express relationships and force, and (c) the combination of these two 
types of representation plus connotation (15.4). Language fulfils the task of sharing that 
meaning, that is language expresses meaning; it does not create meaning. Mind, Meaning and Miscommunication 
96 
Having made that point, in the concluding sections of the thesis I wish to consider 
briefly how this concept of meaning not only fits into the modular concept of mind, but 
indeed demands that concept. To explain this point, I focus on the process of extracting 
meaning from utterances. 
15.8 Mental modules and an iterative process 
 
An utterance is a linear sequence of symbols, whether signed, written or spoken. 
Within that sequence are individual sounds, words and expressions. It is not significant 
whether we start to extract meaning before the utterance or sentence is complete, or wait 
until we identify the closing signal (a full stop in writing; some change in intonation or 
breathing in the case of speaking). Whichever is the case, it is very tempting to assume that 
the process of extraction is also linear, but this is clearly not so. 
 
In a famous edition of The Two Ronnies on BBC television (cited in Frith 2007 p 
174) confusion arises when Ronnie Barker, as assistant in a hardware store, cannot decode 
what Ronnie Corbett is saying. He starts by thinking that the latter is saying “four candles” 
but it turns out that he is saying “fork ’andles”. Ronnie Corbett then asks for “bathroom 
plugs; rubber” but when Ronnie Barker brings him a bath plug it turns out he meant a 
rubberised 13amp plug. 
 
In order to correctly determine the phonetic sounds comprising an utterance [10.1], 
we sometimes need information about the possible words of the utterance. To correctly 
determine the individual words within an utterance we require clues, either from the 
remainder of the utterance or the context of the utterance, about the meaning of the 
utterance. The process of extracting meaning is both bottom to top and top to bottom, with 
a constant move between the two.  
 
We do not move in steady progression from word meaning to expression meaning 
to sentence meaning; nor do we start from sentence meaning and deduce the meaning of 
terms and expressions from that. We constantly move between the different levels of 
meaning, back and forth, back and forth, until we have extracted our best understanding of 
the utterance meaning. We are not conscious of the different processes involved in doing 
so, nor of the repeated moves between them, until something goes wrong. 
 
 If Ronnie Corbett had been in the kitchen looking at the cake that Ronnie Barker 
had baked for his young son’s birthday, there would have been no problem distinguishing 
“four candles” from “fork ’andles”. On the other hand, if Ronnie C. had said in the 
hardware shop “fork ’andles. I broke mine digging the garden” the confusion would not 
have arisen. 
 
If a mother hands over her young child to the nanny to take to the swimming pool, 
the nanny will extract the words “guard Dennis well” from what the mother says without 
even considering that she could have been commenting about the garden (“garden is 
swell”). She extracts those words partly because of clues in the intonation of the speaker, 
and partly because of clues in the context. 
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It is clear from these examples that extracting words from an utterance has regard 
not just to the actual symbols, but also to meanings. Carruthers proposes that the language 
faculty divides into three basic elements: processes for what I have termed expressing 
meaning, processes for extracting meaning, and a common database (Carruthers 2006 pp 
186ff). Generally speaking (the most obvious exceptions are words learnt by Scrabble 
players to include rarely-used letters) the representations of terms in our database are linked 
to their meaning, ie their senseF [5.4 and figures 5.2 and 5.3]. 
 
It is also essential in many cases to relate the terms of an utterance directly to the 
circumstances. If I am walking down the street with my friend and she says “He is tall, isn’t 
he?”, I need to identify the target of her comment, for example by tracking where her eyes 
are directed. There must be interaction between the linguistic modules and other modules, 
for example the module controlling the focus of one’s vision. Again, this is subconscious. 
When I hear the utterance, the extraction of the meaning of her use of “he” is immediate 
and subconscious. 
 
If the meaning generated by the terms extracted by the word recognition module 
turn out to be wrong, then the module is re-entered to try again. The clue that the wrong 
result was returned may be the response of the audience (as in the case of the two Ronnies) 
or our own assessment of the situation.  
 
In section 11.3 I discussed how we select a particular senseF of a term that has 
multiple senseFs. If I hear an utterance with the terms “the houses of” I will recognise the 
term “house” and its plural marker and have a provisional idea of the meaning. If the 
following words are “the middle classes” there will be no need to change the meaning 
already extracted for “house”; but if the utterance continues with “parliament”, then I must 
change my senseF of “house”. 
 
At this point in the process of extracting meaning from a stream of sounds there 
appear to be at least four modules at work, each of which feeds into the following module 
and each of which may need to be re-entered when output from a subsequent module 
requires. In the case of a spoken utterance, these modules perform the following tasks: 
 
  Extract a sequence of phonetic symbols  
  Extract a sequence of words from the stream of phonetic symbols 
  Extract a sequence of term meanings (senseFs) from the stream of words 
  Extract meanings for expressions from combinations of non-innate terms and relational 
terms. 
 
My intention in listing these modules is two-fold. Firstly, I wish to put forward a 
possible explanation for the various communicative processes and cases of 
miscommunication that I have discussed in this thesis. It may be said that this is a matter of 
psychology or the philosophy of psychology, rather than philosophy of mind, although the 
border between the branches of philosophy and the related empirical sciences is not always 
that clear (see Bermudez 2005 p ix). But my second intention is to show that the theory of Mind, Meaning and Miscommunication 
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meaning that I have put forward fits well with the philosophical theory of the modularity of 
mind. 
 
With the various modules that I have proposed so far, the utteree is able to extract 
the literal meaning of the utterance. That is, he or she can perceive an initial pattern of 
relationships between non-innate representations in his or her mind. The process of 
determining the intended meaning of an utterance from the literal meaning, in a number of 
different circumstances, was outlined in section 14.8. In normal conversation it is probable 
that the steps involved will be carried out subconsciously with further dedicated modules. 
These modules would be involved in comparing the meaning of the utterance as determined 
by the modules already listed in this section with other factors. These might include our 
preconceptions (for example, about implicature [11.4]) and our expectations (for example, 
about how our partner thinks about us – see section 8.5). 
 
When studying serious texts it is likely that some of these processes will be carried 
out consciously. Why, I might ask myself, does the poet choose to make this particular 
statement? Alternatively, I might question the output of a subconscious process, for 
example by asking why do I sense that a reference is not as glowing as would be expected? 
 
At the end of this process of interaction and reaction between a number of discrete 
modules there emerges a pattern of representations that is the best approximation possible 
in the mind of the utteree to the pattern in the mind of the utterer, the meaning which they 
intended to communicate. Meaning has been transferred from utterer to utteree. 
15.9 Conclusion 
 
Meaning is a mental phenomenon. It subsists in two essentially different types of 
representation in the mind/brain and the pattern of relationships between them. These 
representations are linked to representations of terms which form the vocabulary of our 
communal language. This language is a gateway to meaning, not a repository of meaning.  
We use it in three distinct though inter-related ways: 
 
1.  To acquire the terms for, and ideas of, matters of which we have no direct 
experience; 
2.  To express our meanings to others; 
3.  To extract the meaning expressed by others. 
 
These three processes involving meaning are carried out by a combination of 
modules within the mind in an iterative manner. There is no linear progression from, for 
example, hearing an utterance to extracting its meaning. Instead, the various modules are 
used again and again, as fresh information becomes available from the output of other 
modules. 
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